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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, many scholars and commentators have
explored why the West has been more economically developed and
technologically advanced than other parts of the world. In his new
book, Civilization: The West and the Rest, renowned historian Niall
Ferguson identified six “killer applications” that have helped the West
1
achieve its rise to global dominance. In a cautiously titled book, Why
the West Rules—for Now, archaeologist-historian Ian Morris also
questioned why the West has dominated the globe for the past two
centuries and whether such dominance would continue amid the rise of
2
China, India, and other emerging powers. Using a different entry point,
Newsweek International editor Fareed Zakaria explored the “rise of the
rest,” discussing how global powers could shape up in what he called the
3
“Post-American World.” Although all of these books carry a mostly
positive message, they were all written against a background of growing
worries that the West will eventually lose its competitive edge.
Indeed, the release of these books has coincided with the growing
attention commentators are now paying to the rise of Asia. While some
4
wonder whether the twenty-first century will be the Asia Century,
1. NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST 13 (2011).
2. IAN MORRIS, WHY THE WEST RULES—FOR NOW: THE PATTERNS OF HISTORY,
AND WHAT THEY REVEAL ABOUT THE FUTURE (2010).
3. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008).
4. See, e.g., MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC: ASEAN, APEC
AND BEYOND 3 (2008) (noting the “overblown hyperbole about the ‘Asian Century’”);
Symposium, The Asian Century?, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2011) (interrogating whether
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others have examined the growing role of the so-called BRICS
5
countries, which initially included Brazil, China, India, and Russia but
have now been generalized to cover other emerging middle-income
6
countries, such as South Africa. A growing number of books have also
7
looked at the role of China and India in Africa and Latin America.
this century will be the “Asian Century”). Some commentators, however, are more certain.
See, e.g., STEVE CHAN, CHINA, THE US AND THE POWER-TRANSITION THEORY: A
CRITIQUE ix (2007) (“It is anticipated that by the year 2025, seven of the world’s ten largest
economies will be located in Asia.”); ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY: THE
RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE
OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB (2005) (declaring the twenty-first century as the “Chinese
Century”); EDWARD TSE, THE CHINA STRATEGY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE
WORLD’S FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMY 6 (2010) (stating that “one of the safer predictions
for the first half of the twenty-first century is that China’s growth, supported by that of India
and several other countries, will make Asia the source of more than half the world’s gross
domestic product by around 2030”).
5. See Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to
2050 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99), available at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf (advancing the concept of
the BRICs countries); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE WORLD IN 2050: THE
ACCELERATING SHIFT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWER: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/worldin-2050-jan-2011.pdf (“E7 [China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey]
would overtake the G7 before 2040.”).
6. See, e.g., CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: THE CRISIS OF EQUITY IN THE NEW KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 221–22 (2012)
(expanding BRICS to cover other emerging middle-income economies); Peter K. Yu, Access
to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2008)
[hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines] (expanding the BRICS acronym to cover South Africa);
Sébastien Hervieu, South Africa Gains Entry to BRIC Club, GUARDIAN WKLY. (Apr. 19,
2011, 09:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/19/south-africa-joins-bric-club
(reporting about the South African president joining his counterparts from Brazil, Russia,
India, and China for the third summit meeting of the informal group in China).
7. See, e.g., AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Firoze Manji & Stephen
Marks eds., 2007); CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR
HEGEMON? (Alex De Waal & Richard Dowden eds., 2007); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009); HARRY G. BROADMAN,
AFRICA’S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND INDIA’S NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER (2007); PÁDRAIG
CARMODY, THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (2011); CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: BEIJING’S STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Joshua Eisenman et al.
eds., 2007) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD]; CHINA INTO AFRICA:
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008); CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA:
A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); CHINA’S
EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND
THE UNITED STATES (Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S
EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE]; CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE
SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji
eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S NEW ROLE]; ROBERT EVAN ELLIS, CHINA IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE WHATS AND WHEREFORES (2009); KEVIN GALLAGHER & ROBERTO
PORZECANSKI, THE DRAGON IN THE ROOM: CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF LATIN
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8

Some even contrast the oft-criticized “Washington Consensus” with the
“Beijing Consensus,” a term coined by former Time foreign editor
9
Joshua Ramo. In March 2011, the Associated Press launched the global
economic tracker, examining developments in emerging developing
10
countries. As the press reasoned, these developments are likely to
have important global implications ranging from increased prices for

AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (2010); GEOFFREY KEMP, THE EAST MOVES WEST:
INDIA, CHINA, AND ASIA’S GROWING PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2010); BEN
SIMPFENDORFER, THE NEW SILK ROAD: HOW A RISING ARAB WORLD IS TURNING AWAY
FROM THE WEST AND REDISCOVERING CHINA (2009); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA:
ENGAGEMENT AND COMPROMISE (2006); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA
(2009); THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds., 2010).
8. John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for International
Economics, coined the term “Washington Consensus.” John Williamson, What Washington
Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED?
7 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
The Washington Consensus was derived from
recommendations in ten different areas: (1) fiscal deficits; (2) public expenditure priorities;
(3) tax reform; (4) interest rates; (5) the exchange rate; (6) trade policy; (7) foreign direct
investment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights. Id.
9. JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004), available at
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf. As he explained:
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the place of
a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms about why the
physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and Brasilia. The first
theorem repositions the value of innovation. Rather than the “old-physics”
argument that developing countries must start development with trailing-edge
technology (copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of bleeding-edge
innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than the problems
change creates. In physics terms, it is about using innovation to reduce the frictionlosses of reform.
The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to
control from the top you need a whole set of new tools. It looks beyond measures
like per-capita GDP and focuses instead of quality-of-life, the only way to manage
the massive contradictions of Chinese development. This second theorem demands
a development model where sustainability and equality become first considerations,
not luxuries. Because Chinese society is an unstable stew of hope, ambition, fear,
misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-theory can provide meaningful
organization.
Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one that
stresses using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be tempted to tread
on your toes.
Id. at 11–12. For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally id.; STEFAN A. HALPER,
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010).
10. Paul Wiseman, Developing Nations’ Rise Poses Risks for Rich Ones, MSNBC.COM
(Mar.
30,
2011,
1:44
AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42329602/ns/businessworld_business/.
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11

raw materials to an accelerated pace of global economic recovery.
The last time policymakers and commentators paid such an
enormous amount of attention to Asia was two decades ago, amid the
rise of Japan and other newly industrialized countries. The elevated
status of these countries, in turn, led some Asian leaders to declare the
need to recognize, promote, and protect the so-called “Asian values,”
12
which they claimed had provided a formula for economic success, or
13
the so-called “East Asian miracle.” Although today’s discourse seems
to be going in the same direction as that of two decades ago, it is
actually quite different. The present discourse is not simply about the
economic rise of Asia. Rather, it touches on how China, India, and
other countries in the region have greatly improved their
competitiveness and technological capabilities. To some extent, these
countries are now threatening to compete with the West on its home
turf while playing its own game.
Indeed, a growing volume of literature has now focused on the role
of the BRICS countries in the international intellectual property
14
system —an area that was once dominated by Western developed
countries. Such literature complements nicely the ever-growing volume
of books and articles on intellectual property law developments in
15
China and India. In a recent article, leading international intellectual
11. Id.
12. See discussion Part I.A.
13. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1993). See generally HA-JOON CHANG, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
EXPERIENCE: THE MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE (2006) (discussing the Asian
miracle and the ensuing economic crisis).
14. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317 (2006); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging
BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6; Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing
Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking (Int’l Law &
Justice, New York University School of Law, Working Paper No. 2009/5, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785.
15. See, e.g., Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies
in China: How a Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749
(2010); Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1 (2000); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203 (2006); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571
(2009); Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491
(2007); Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 273 (2006); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in
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property scholar Jerome Reichman questioned whether developing
countries should follow the developed countries’ lead in adopting their
intellectual property system or whether they should lead in the
16
knowledge economy by building their own comparative advantages.
As he declared:
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an ancillary
but important role, there are, roughly speaking, two different
approaches on the table. One is to play it safe by sticking to
time-tested IP solutions implemented in OECD [Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, with
perhaps a relatively greater emphasis on the flexibilities still
permitted under TRIPS (and not overridden by relevant FTAs).
The other approach is to embark on a more experimental
path . . . that advanced technology countries currently find so
17
daunting.
One set of questions commentators have yet to explore concerns
whether Asian countries will take unified positions on international
intellectual property law and policy. Can we identify any underlying
“Asian values,” approaches, or practices in the area? Are the
developments in Asia homogenous enough to foster common positions
within the region? Does it matter whether any of the Asian countries
can attain hegemonic status on the continent? If Asia indeed will
assume a more dominant global role in the future, as commentators
have claimed, which countries will be involved, how will they be
involved, and what issues will be found on their policy agendas?
These questions are important for at least two reasons. First, given
the growing attention scholars have paid to Asia and the so-called
BRICS countries, a systematic analysis of the role these countries will
play in future international intellectual property negotiations is likely to
provide a better understanding of the international intellectual property

China in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates
to Partners]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed.,
2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle].
16. Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2009).
17. Id. at 1126.
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system.
Second, intellectual property industries have repeatedly
criticized China and Southeast Asian countries for their widespread
18
A better grasp of Asian
piracy and counterfeiting problems.
developments will certainly help anticipate those challenges confronting
the international intellectual property system.
Part I of this Article examines intellectual property developments in
relation to the decades-old “Asian values” debate. Although the debate
began in the human rights context, this Part uses the debate as a starting
point to evaluate whether Asian cultures, practices, and conditions can
help provide the needed rallying force to help Asia establish unified
positions on intellectual property law and policy. This Part further
examines the region’s diversity in economic and technological
developments and the continuous rivalry among the different regional
powers. This Part concludes that one can neither locate any distinct
values, approaches, or practices on intellectual property law and policy
nor identify any established pan-Asian positions in the area.
Part II explores the role Asian countries will play if these emerging
countries exert more influence on the development of the international
intellectual property system.
Drawing on the earlier discussion
concerning how Japan and, to some extent, South Korea are unlikely to
team up with other Asian countries to develop a united front for the
Asian developing world, this Part contends that Asian countries as a
group may not be able to establish a position comparable to that of the
European Union or the African Group. Nevertheless, this Part argues
that, if China, India, and members of the ASEAN (Association of
19
Southeast Asian Nations) agree to team up to form a “Chindiasean”
alliance, the resulting alliance will be a formidable force in future
international intellectual property negotiations.
Part III concludes with a discussion of ten key items that will find
their way to Chindiasean’s common policy agenda if such an alliance is
ultimately established. Because of the alliance’s potential role in
shaping global intellectual property norms, Chindiasean is as much a
20
“normative community” as it is a political alliance. The first five items
18. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
19. The ten current ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Member
Countries, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
20. SIMON TAY, ASIA ALONE: THE DANGEROUS POST-CRISIS DIVIDE FROM
AMERICA 150 (2010) (advancing the concept of “Asia’s normative community”). As
Professor Tay explained, the development of an Asian normative community would offer at
least three benefits:
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in the agenda concern traditional issues advanced by less developed
countries. The remaining items represent new issues on which the
international community has yet to achieve a consensus or formulate a
position. Taking a first look at this common policy agenda in the
intellectual property literature, this Part seeks to provide insights into
issues that will emerge in future international intellectual property
negotiations.
II. THE ASIAN VALUES DEBATE
A. Human Rights
The Asian values debate, which began in the human rights area, has
been quite controversial. Although it is hard to pinpoint which values
are included in these so-called Asian values, commentators have
generally defined such values to include “authoritarianism, cooperation,
21
harmony, and order.” By embracing cultural relativism, critics argue,
the Asian values debate “undermine[s] . . . the universality of the human
rights regime as an empirical matter and present[s] a challenge to the
normative claim that human rights should be interpreted and
22
implemented in a similar manner everywhere.” The debate has also
raised challenging questions about whether Asian countries, including
those that have hitherto had a disappointing human rights record, could
23
use Asian values as a “cultural excuse” for transgressions in the area.
The first of these is, of course, the solution to the issue [that needs cooperation in
Asia]. Another would be to the benefit of the United States and China working
alongside each other, but with potential frictions and awkwardness eased in a
multilateral setting. The third benefit for ASEAN and other Asians is that, unlike a
G-2, they would have a role and be better assured that their fate would not be
decided by the two powers without their participation.
TAY, supra note 20, at 155.
21. See, e.g., Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over
Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 109 (1998) [hereinafter Davis,
Constitutionalism and Political Culture] (noting that Asian values “seem to include
authoritarianism, cooperation, harmony, and order as the predominant values of Asian
culture”).
22. Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates
About “Values in Asia,” 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).
23. See Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41
MCGILL L.J. 743, 747 (1996) (noting that commentators “suspect that the cultural argument
is a pretext to excuse continuing transgressions by repressive governments”); see also Michael
Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES:
LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 22 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES] (“It is important to note that in the
Bangkok Declaration Asian governments were formulating a response not only to a Western
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24

Championed by Malaysian and Singaporean leaders, the “Asian
values” debate reached its climax when Asian countries adopted the
Bangkok Declaration at the Asian preparatory conference before the
25
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. Although this
state-coordinated declaration did not articulate the oft-discussed Asian
values, it states explicitly that, “while human rights are universal in
nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the
significance of national and regional particularities and various
26
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”
The position articulated in this declaration was attractive to many
participants of the Asian regional conference, many of whom had
repeatedly criticized the existing international human rights regime for
ignoring non-Western interests. The concern for a lack of cultural
sensitivity is not new; it can be traced back to the regime’s inception.
When the regime’s founding document, the Universal Declaration of
27
Human Rights,
was drafted, the American Anthropological
Association already sent a long memorandum to the Human Rights
challenge but primarily to the challenge of their own people.”).
24. Cf. MARK BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION IN EAST ASIA:
POLITICS, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 135 (2007) [hereinafter BEESON,
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION] (“In Southeast Asia, in particular, a number of
prominent figures—including Malaysia’s Mahathir [bin Mohamad] and Singapore’s Lee Kuan
Yew—were trumpeting the merits of ‘Asian values’ as an explanation for the region’s
economic take-off.”).
25. World Conference on Human Rights, Regional Meeting for Asia, 29 March–2
April 1993, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human
Rights,
U.N.
Doc.
A/Conf.157/PC/59
(Apr.
7,
1993),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/9d23b88f115fb827802569030037ed
44?Opendocument.
26. Id. ¶ 8. For discussions of Asian values and the Bangkok Declaration, see
generally DANIEL BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL THINKING FOR AN
EAST ASIAN CONTEXT (2006) [hereinafter BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY];
DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA
(2000) [hereinafter BELL, EAST MEETS WEST]; CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm.
Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998) [hereinafter
DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES]; THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R.
Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 23;
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 208
(James T.H. Tang ed., 1995) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS]; Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, supra note 23; Karen Engle,
Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
291 (2000); Peerenboom, supra note 22; Tay, supra note 23.
27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.
(1948).
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Commission, expressing its concern, or even fear, that the Declaration
would become an ethnocentric document. As the association put it in
the now infamous memorandum, “‘[t]he primary task’ the drafters faced
was to find a solution to the following problem: ‘How can the proposed
Declaration be applicable to all human beings and not be a statement of
rights conceived only in terms of values prevalent in the countries of
28
Western Europe and America?’”
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Bangkok Declaration was
29
subsequently rejected at the Vienna Conference. Commentators have
also widely questioned whether Asian values actually exist in the human
rights area. As Randall Peerenboom reminded us:
[t]he “Asian values” debate was not a single debate, not only
about values in Asia, and not only about universalism versus
relativism. Rather it was a series of debates about a range of
issues. It is a mistake to reduce the many complex debates to the
politically charged and easily resolved issue of whether
authoritarian governments (sometimes) have invoked culture to
deny citizens in their countries their rights. It does a disservice to
the difficulty of the issues and the increasingly sophisticated and
nuanced views of those who are trying to take diversity seriously
to simply dismiss them as apologists for dictators. Put more
bluntly, it is intellectually lazy and emblematic of the arrogant
and narrow-minded ethnocentricism that has led many in Asia,
and elsewhere, to view the human rights movement as the latest
neo-colonial attempt to impose with missionary zeal the values,

28. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT ix (1999) (quoting the 1947 memorandum from the
American Anthropological Association to the U.N. Human Rights Commission); JOHN P.
HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 29
(1983) (recalling in his memoirs that Chinese delegate Chang Peng-chun “suggested that [he]
put [his] other duties aside for six months and study Chinese philosophy . . . [implying] that
Western influences might be too great”); id. at 32 (“With two exceptions, all [of the draft
documents he relied on in putting together his draft outline of provisions in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)] came from English-speaking sources and all of
them from the democratic West.”). But see Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1143–44
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests] (discussing the
diverse cultural and religious backgrounds of delegates participating in the drafting of the
UDHR).
29. Michael C. Davis, Preface to HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note
23, at vii, viii.
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institutions, and ways of life popular in the West on the Rest.

Interestingly, although there has been voluminous literature on
Asian values, those discussions mostly reflect values in East Asia, as
opposed to those found throughout Asia. For example, a considerable
amount of literature has focused on both the tension and compatibility
31
between Confucianism and Western human rights.
While
Confucianism undoubtedly has some influence in many Asian countries,
such as China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, it has less
32
relevance to other Asian countries, especially those in South Asia.
Indeed, it was ironic that the locus of the Confucianism debate was in
East Asia, while the Bangkok Declaration was adopted more than two
thousand miles away in Thailand.
B. Intellectual Property
In recent years, the debate on Asian values in the human rights area
has slowly disappeared. Meanwhile, commentators have paid growing
attention to intellectual property developments in Asia, due largely to
the region’s rapid rise and the increasing interest in intellectual property
and technology matters. In light of these developments, this Part
undertakes a holistic inquiry into whether any Asian values in
intellectual property law and policy actually exist and whether one could
identify unified pan-Asian positions in the area. This Part focuses in
particular on the region’s cultural, economic, technological, and
geopolitical developments.

30. Peerenboom, supra note 22, at 1–2. As he elaborated:
Descriptive relativism holds that the moral beliefs, standards, values, or principles of
individuals, groups or societies conflict in fundamental ways, and thus disagreements
will remain in some cases even after all factual and logical disputes are resolved.
These fundamental differences may be due to culture; variation in the personality,
psychology, or experiences of individuals; or to other factors such as levels of
economic development, the relative stability or instability of the state, and the
likelihood of civil war or terrorism. Virtually no one denies the truth of descriptive
relativism. Broad multi-country studies have found significant regional differences
with respect to democratization, labor rights, women’s rights and personal integrity
rights. Most of the debate therefore is over two other forms of relativism, normative
and metaethical relativism, or other related issues.
Id. at 7–8.
31. See, e.g., BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26; BELL, EAST
MEETS WEST, supra note 26; CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26; DE
BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26; THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 26; HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 23.
32. See infra discussion Part I.B.1.
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1. Cultural Developments
In the past two decades, commentators have used cultural
differences to account for the massive piracy and counterfeiting
problems in Asia. Very typical are discussions of how Asian cultures, in
particular Confucianism, have militated against intellectual property
33
reforms. Similar discussions have also been made of the familial and
community values and strong protection of the public interest as
34
embodied in Islam. Although the latter discussions focus primarily on
countries in the Middle East, they have high relevance to many Muslim35
majority countries in Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
As far as Confucianism is concerned, the starting point of most
discussions is William Alford’s seminal work, To Steal a Book Is an

33. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 19–29 (1995) (discussing how
the Confucian culture prevented intellectual property protection from taking root in imperial
China); R. Michael Gadbaw, Republic of Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 272, 275 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J.
Richards eds., 1988) (“An ‘intellectual property culture’ has yet to be developed in Korea.
This cultural gap is typical of many East Asian countries, where the historical attitude toward
intellectual property is noticeably different from that in the West.”); Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey
Mouse” in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996) (“[P]unishing copyright violation contradicts traditional Chinese
moral standards.”); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1,
16–21 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives] (discussing Confucianism as
a partial impediment to improving intellectual property protection and enforcement in
China).
34. See Lise Buranen, “But I Wasn’t Cheating”: Plagiarism and Cross-Cultural
Mythology, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD 63, 66 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (discussing how
some teachers attribute plagiarism by Middle Eastern students to the emphasis of community
and family values in Middle Eastern cultures); Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the
Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other
When We Say “Property”? A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 307, 336 (1996) (noting the various cultural arguments that have been advanced
to identify a distinctly different Islamic approach to copyright). But see Silvia Beltrametti,
The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights Under Islamic Law, in THE PRAGUE YEARBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2009, at 57 (T. Mach et al. eds. 2010) (“[S]ome basic forms of
intellectual property rights can hardly be denied a claim under Shari’a.”). For discussions of
the protection of intellectual property rights under Shari’a, see generally Heba A. Raslan,
Shari’a and the Protection of Intellectual Property—The Example of Egypt, 47 IDEA 497
(2007); Chad M. Cullen, Note, Can TRIPS Live in Harmony with Islamic Law? An
Investigation of the Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Islamic Law, 14 SMU SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 45 (2010).
35. See KEMP, supra note 7, at 241 (“With a population of more than 240 million
people, almost 90 percent of which is Muslim, Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim
country.”).
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Elegant Offense. Although this provocative book has inspired a whole
generation of intellectual property scholars studying developments in
East Asia—myself included—it has also attracted some pointed
criticisms. For example, Shi Wei questioned whether the book’s catchy
title actually created a misleading impression about the cultural values
37
in China, including Confucianism. As he wrote:
“To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense” (Qie Shu Bu Suan
Tou) . . . is a concept unknown to Confucianism and was only
popularized with the 1919 publication of the popular fictional
book Kong Yi Ji, written by the famous novelist Lu Xun. In his
book, Lu exemplifies his belief that literature should be socially
relevant, and attempts to avoid the “clichés” of traditional
Chinese linguistics that, in his view, had hampered and restrained
people’s creative thinking for centuries. In Lu Xun’s portrayal,
Kong Yi Ji was depicted as a poor harlequin, who was “a big,
pallid man whose wrinkled face often bore scars,” and was made
fun of by everybody. He earned a living from copying
manuscripts for rich patrons and sometimes stole books to trade
for wine. His behavior drew on his being soundly beaten. “To
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense” was his argument when he
was taunted. His personal character and way of thinking are thus
far removed from the Confucian values. . . . Indeed, the phrase
“To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense” was unknown to
Chinese until Kong Yi Ji as a fictional character appeared in the
early twentieth century and, interestingly, it was unpopular with
foreigners until Professor Alford’s book . . . made its debut in the
38
mid 1990s.
Ken Shao also noted the many developments in China that Professor
39
Questioning whether Professor Alford had
Alford did not cover.
presented an incomplete picture, Professor Shao encouraged us to
reassess the impact of Confucianism on intellectual property protection
40
and enforcement in China. As more research and archival records
become available, this spirited debate will only advance even further.

36. ALFORD, supra note 33.
37. See Shi Wei, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an
Elegant Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 11 (2006).
38. Id. (footnotes omitted).
39. See Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: What If China Is Not a
Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341.
40. See id.
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To fully understand the debate Professor Alford’s book has inspired,
it is important to distinguish the weak form of his claim from its strong
form. The strong form states that Confucianism militates against
intellectual property reforms in China. It accounts for the failure of the
many reforms pushed by foreign countries and intellectual property
rights holders to induce improvements in intellectual property
protection and enforcement.
Although provocative, this strong form of the claim is likely not
supported by the reality on Chinese soil. As I pointed out in the past,
there are striking similarities between Confucianism and what we have
41
in the West regarding the public domain. While copying may be an
important living process for a Confucian Chinese to acquire
understanding of human behavior, to improve life through self42
cultivation, and to transmit knowledge to the posterity, Chinese poets
and literary theorists widely disagreed on the appropriate extent of
43
copying.
If the Chinese did not subscribe to intellectual property
notions, it is only those notions that were derived from a maximalist
tradition, where the importance of the public domain is largely
44
ignored.
Moreover, traditional Chinese culture does not always call for
verbatim reproduction, the means by which massive piracy and
counterfeiting are often conducted. Rather, Confucianism has called for
the transformative use of preexisting works that is tailored to the user’s
needs and conditions. As Professor Alford acknowledged, through the
editing of the Classics and his comments in the Analects, Confucius
demonstrated that “transmission, far from being a passive endeavor,
entailed selection and adaptation if it was to be meaningful to oneself,
41. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 224–25; see also ALFORD, supra
note 33, at 20 (“The indispensability of the past for personal moral growth dictated there be
based access to the common heritage of all Chinese.”).
42. See ALFORD, supra note 33, at 28 (“Interaction with the past is one of the
distinctive modes of intellectual and imaginative endeavor in traditional Chinese culture.”
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting ARTISTS AND TRADITIONS: USES OF THE PAST IN
CHINESE CULTURE xi (Christian Murck ed., 1976))). The Chinese believed that “the essence
of human understanding had long since been discerned by those who had gone before and, in
particular, by the sage rulers collectively referred to as the Ancients who lived in a distant,
idealized ‘golden age.’” Id. Subsequent generations thus have to interact thoroughly with the
past in order to acquire this understanding to guide their behavior, to improve through selfcultivation, and to transmit such knowledge to the posterity. See id. at 25.
43. See id. at 26–29 (noting that Chinese poets and literary theorists disagreed on the
appropriate use of past works).
44. For a recent discussion of the public domain, see generally JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2010).
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one’s contemporaries, and one’s successors.” Indeed, the ability to
make transformative use of preexisting works can demonstrate one’s
comprehension of and devotion to the core of the Chinese culture as
well as the ability to distinguish the present from the past through
original thoughts.
To some extent, the need for meaningful transmission in traditional
Chinese culture can be analogized to the transformative use doctrine
pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
46
Music, Inc.
In Campbell, a music publisher brought a copyright
infringement action against the rap band 2 Live Crew for its salacious
47
rap parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Emphasizing that
transformative works are socially important and exploring whether fair
use covers the contested parody, Justice Souter noted the importance of
transformative works:
Although . . . transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright,
and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
48
against a finding of fair use.
In the end, the Court suggested that 2 Live Crew’s rendition of the song
might have constituted fair use and remanded the case to the lower
49
court.
Just as it is important to ask what the Confucian position of copying
is, it is equally important to examine the Western position in intellectual
property law and policy, if such a position exists at all. Individualism
alone, for example, does not fully summarize the Western intellectual
property position. In the past decade, intellectual property scholars
have widely questioned the narrow and incomplete definition of
intellectual property rights advanced by developed countries and their
50
supportive rights holders. As the West develops more sophisticated
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

ALFORD, supra note 33, at 25.
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
See id. at 594.
See, e.g., James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, LAW & CONTEMP.
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notions of intellectual property rights, it may find that these notions and
Confucianism may be more compatible with each other than one has
51
anticipated.
Compared with the strong form of Professor Alford’s claim, its weak
form seems to be more in line with the reality on the ground, although
52
native Chinese scholars continue to disagree with such an assessment.
This weak claim states that Confucianism has prevented Western
53
notions of intellectual property rights from taking root in China.
Nevertheless, it does not suggest any incompatibility between the two
notions. Nor does it contend that Confucianism will militate against
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 1, 32 (noting the importance of “look[ing] at the opposite of
property [which refers to the limitations, negations, inversions and correctives of property]
with the same historical care, analytical precision, and occasional utopian romanticism that
we display when looking at property”); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 52–144 (2004) (discussing the use of limits in
property law to cabin intellectual property rights); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property:
Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004) (stating that “traditional Property
rights entail significant concurrent obligations or responsibilities imposed on the proprietary
owner as an incident of their Property ownership”); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the
Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (“Although people tend to focus
on the absolute nature of property—the right to exclude in particular—real property law
contains many limitations, safeguards, and obligations, such as adverse possessions, eminent
domain, easements, servitudes, nuisance, zoning, irrevocable licenses, the Rule Against
Perpetuities, and the waste and public trust doctrines.”).
51. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 223–25 (discussing the
compatibility between the Chinese culture and Western intellectual property notions); Yu,
Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 33, at 76–77 (same). Compare XIANFA art. 20
(1982) (“The state promotes the development of the natural and social sciences, disseminates
knowledge of science and technology, and commends and rewards achievements in scientific
research as well as technological innovations and inventions.”), and id. art. 47 (“The state
encourages and assists creative endeavors conducive to the interests of the people that are
made by citizens engaged in education, science, technology, literature, art and other cultural
work.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
52. See Charles R. Stone, Comment, What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary
Observations on Classical Chinese Attitudes Toward What the West Calls Intellectual Property,
92 MARQ. L. REV. 199, 199–200 (2008) (“Chinese scholars continue to aver that China
invented at least one kind of protection—copyright—over six hundred years earlier. They
also disagree upon the factors that led to the recognition of intellectual property.” (footnote
omitted)). Professor Alford did acknowledge the existence of this line of scholarship.
Nevertheless, he contended that their enquiries to date “treat[ed] imperial efforts to control
the dissemination of ideas as constituting copyright” and ended there. ALFORD, supra note
33, at 18.
53. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 33, at 1 (considering “why intellectual property law,
and in particular copyright, has never taken hold in China”); id. at 2 (noting that “imperial
China did not develop a sustained indigenous counterpart to intellectual property law, in
significant measure because of the character of Chinese political culture”).
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intellectual property law reforms. Thus, if reforms are introduced—
either internally through the borrowing of foreign ideas or externally in
response to foreign pressure and coercive trade policies—such reforms
may help China establish an exogenously developed intellectual
property system.
In fact, legal transplants from abroad and coercive trade pressure
from the United States were the primary means by which the new
54
intellectual property regime was established in China. It is therefore
no surprise that foreign legal transplants were also a key focus of
55
Professor Alford’s book. Although the level of overall intellectual
property protection in China has yet to satisfy the United States
government and its rights holders, improvements in such protection had
been quite significant in the past two decades.
When we go beyond the discussion of Confucianism to locate Asian
values, the task becomes even more challenging. Regardless of whether
we embrace the strong or weak form of Professor Alford’s claim, we
have to think seriously about whether it actually makes sense to
generalize the Confucianism debate to cover other Asian cultures.
There are several reasons.
First, as pointed out earlier, Confucianism only forms the cultural
basis of a small number of countries in East Asia. Islam, for example, is
important to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
Hinduism is very important to South Asia, covering places such as
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. Buddhism is also very important to
Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Indeed, as David Kang observed, “[t]he states
of Southeast Asia experienced twin cultural influences, from India and
56
from China.”
Even in China, Confucianism is only one of the three dominant
philosophies in traditional Chinese society; Buddhism and Daoism had
57
and continue to have very significant influence. As one commentator
54. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 15, at 185–88 (discussing the establishment of the
intellectual property regime in China in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of external pressure).
55. See ALFORD, supra note 33, at 30–55 (discussing foreign transplants in the
intellectual property area and how the Chinese “learn[ed] the law at gunpoint”).
56. DAVID C. KANG, EAST ASIA BEFORE THE WEST: FIVE CENTURIES OF TRADE
AND TRIBUTE 52 (2010); see also BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note
24, at 49 (“Evidence of the influence of other cultures on Southeast Asia can be seen from the
extensive impact of Hinduism and Buddhism, although the historical record of the region’s
early development is sketchy and imperfect.”); GEORGE COEDES, THE INDIANIZED STATES
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1996) (tracing India’s influence on Southeast Asian culture).
57. See ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
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observed, “[t]he bulk of early book publishing in China was in fact
inspired by Buddhism, not Confucianism, and was directed at the
acquisition of religious merit that appears to have been unrelated, and
was perhaps even antithetical, to what we today would consider a
58
property right.”
Also present in the Chinese territory are many
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 11 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that, along with Confucianism,
“Taoism and Buddhism were also influential in some periods and in some aspects of life”);
ARTHUR F. WRIGHT, BUDDHISM IN CHINESE HISTORY 70–85 (1979) (discussing the
importance of Buddhism and Daoism in Chinese history); Stone, supra note 52, at 226 (noting
that “Buddhism and Daoism became quite influential in their own right”); Christoph Antons,
Legal Culture and History of Law in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA 13,
22–23 (Christopher Heath ed., 2003) (noting the importance of Confucianism, Taoism,
Buddhism, and Legalism in China); Rollie Lal, China’s Relations with South Asia, in CHINA
AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 7, at 133, 133 (“China has a long history of
relations with India, beginning with cultural and religious contact between the two by 100 CE.
Buddhism traveled from India through the Silk Route in Central Asia to China, mixing with
the existing Daoist and Confucian philosophies there.”).
58. Stone, supra note 52, at 202. As he elaborated:
Although there is no doubt that Confucianism in its various incarnations played a
central role in the development of printing and the dissemination of classical texts
that, in turn, contributed to the eventual development of Chinese intellectual
property, it is probably a mistake to focus all of our attention upon Confucianism in
the first place.
It was not for two or three hundred years after the invention of printing that the
Confucian classics appeared in print. Chinese historians also note that as early as
the turn of the seventh century, Buddhist scriptures reproduced among the populace
outnumbered the Confucian classics by thousands of times. The world’s earliest
extant complete book on paper is probably the Buddhist text Parable Sutra (256).
The earliest extant printed text is a Buddhist dharani sutra scroll (c. 704–751)
discovered in a temple in Korea in 1966; it was probably printed in China. The first
complete printed book is probably the Buddhist Diamond Sutra (868) discovered by
Aurel Stein in Dunhuang during his second expedition of 1907. And when
commercial printing arose in the tenth century, the output was unprecedented:
“nearly half a million copies of Buddhist books and pictures are known to have been
printed in the eastern part of China in one small area alone over a period of less
than half a century.”
It is thus no secret that Buddhism is inseparable from the earliest book copying,
production, and printing in China. The reproduction of religious texts is uniquely
appealing to Buddhists because it is a tenet of that religion that the copying and
distribution of its sutras is a way to receive the blessings of its founder. The Buddha,
it is said, once remarked, “Whoever wishes to gain power from the dharani [charms]
must write seventy-seven copies and place them in a pagoda.” The underlying
“religious motivation is . . . confirmed by the earliest printings of the dharani
discovered in Japan and Korea.” Furthermore, because Buddhism ideally required
the “austere ideal of renunciation of the world of things,” it is not a philosophy that
would naturally be expected to place much value on the concept of “owning” rights
to printed texts, especially when these texts were religious and produced for pious
motives. Indeed, the concept of “property” is something that Buddhism is unlikely
to celebrate, as the material world is itself “a deception, a dream from which we
must awaken sooner or later.” In other words, Buddhism is not only inextricably
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minority cultures and beliefs, including the Zhuang, Hui, Uygur, Yi,
59
Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, and Buyei.
Second, even if we focus only on Confucianism, that philosophy
continues to evolve. What we find in Confucianism today is actually
60
quite different from the teachings of Confucius. From the Analects to
Neo-Confucianism propounded by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) to the living
61
principles used in modern Asian societies, Confucian teachings have
undergone many significant transformations. There are also many
related to all aspects of China’s earliest book production, reproductions of its texts
were initially made in vastly greater numbers than the Confucian classics, and its
underlying philosophy seems uniquely ill-suited to the creation of what we in the
West might consider a property right.
Id. at 227–29 (footnotes omitted). For early texts on Buddhism and Daoism, see generally
Lucille Chia, The Uses of Print in Early Quanzhen Daoist Texts, in KNOWLEDGE AND TEXT
PRODUCTION IN AN AGE OF PRINT: CHINA, 900–1400, at 167 (Lucille Chia & Hilde De
Weerdt eds., 2011) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE AND TEXT PRODUCTION]; Susan Shih-shan
Huang, Early Buddhist Illustrated Prints in Hangzhou, in KNOWLEDGE AND TEXT
PRODUCTION, supra, at 135.
59. See JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION
176 (6th ed. 1999) (“The largest of the fifty-six minority groups are the Zhuangs (15.4
million), Hui or Chinese Muslims (8.6 million), Uygur (7.2 million), Yi (6.5 million), Tibetans
(4.5 million), Miao (7.3 million), Manchus (9.8 million), Mongols (4.8 million). Bouyei (2.1
million), and Koreans (1.9 million).”).
60. As William Theodore De Bary wrote:
[When questioned “What does Confucianism have to offer today?”] I am . . . obliged
to ask: “[w]hose Confucianism are we talking about?” If it is the original teachings
of Confucius in the Analects, then almost nothing said about Confucianism today
speaks to that. Indeed even the anti-Confucian diatribes earlier in [the twentieth]
century spoke rarely to Confucius’ own views but only to later adaptations or
distortions of them.
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM xi (1991); see also DE
BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 11 (“Problems of continuity and change in the
evolution of major traditions must be considered. Confucianism should not be thought either
static or monolithic—that is, taking the sayings of Confucius and Mencius just by themselves,
to represent an historically developing, often conflicted, and yet gradually maturing
Confucian tradition.”); Liu Shu-hsien, Confucian Ideals and the Real World: A Critical Review
of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thought, in CONFUCIAN TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN
MODERNITY: MORAL EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC CULTURE IN JAPAN AND THE FOUR
MINI-DRAGONS 92, 92 (Tu Wei-Ming ed., 1996) (noting that the term “Confucianism” “may
refer to the philosophical tradition represented by Confucius and Mencius, or it may refer to
the institutions and customs that emerged in the long course of Chinese history through the
influence of Confucian thought”); Benjamin Schwartz, Some Polarities in Confucian Thought,
in CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE CIVILIZATION 3, 3 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1964)
(considering “universal and perennial” questions concerning whether “the original teachings
of the founders [of Confucianism] can be extricated from the interpretations of the
followers”).
61. See generally T.R. REID, CONFUCIUS LIVES NEXT DOOR: WHAT LIVING IN THE
EAST TEACHES US ABOUT LIVING IN THE WEST (2000) (discussing the Confucian principles
in modern Asian societies).
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different strands of Confucianism.
As noted Confucian scholar
Theodore de Bary observed, a strong liberal tradition existed in at least
one strand of Confucianism, even though Confucianism is generally not
62
publicly identified with liberal theories. Likewise, Professor Alford
reminded us that “approaches rooted in portrayals of culture as
essentially impervious to change, whether from within or beyond the
63
society being examined,” run the risk of being unidimensional.
Furthermore, those Asian countries that adopt Confucianism
embrace it for different reasons and to very different extents. As
Professor Kang recently noted:
the main secondary states of East Asia chose Confucianism and
Chinese ideas more for their own reasons than from Chinese
pressure. In Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, the debate about how
to organize government and society occurred between warriors
and scholars, with the Confucian literati winning in Korea and
Vietnam and the warriors ultimately winning in Japan. Although
Chinese ideas were deeply embedded from the founding of these
states, just as significantly, Chinese ideas were grafted onto what
indigenous cultures, and the two coexisted—sometimes
64
uncomfortably—resulting in only partial Sinicization.
Third, by focusing on the discrete values in Asia—whether as Asian
65
values or simply as “values in Asia” —the “Asian values” debate
“underestimates both the historical ruptures of colonization and the
66
present forces of global interaction.” In Michael Davis’ view, “cultural
62. See, e.g., DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 108–09 (discussing how
freedom of expression and association is recognized in “a significant line of Confucian
thought”); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN CHINA (1983) (deriving
the liberal tradition in Confucianism from writings of neo-Confucianist thinkers).
63. ALFORD, supra note 33, at 6.
64. KANG, supra note 56, at 26; see also LUCIAN W. PYE WITH MARY W. PYE, ASIAN
POWER AND POLITICS: THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITY 55 (1985) (“The East
Asian countries of China, Japan, and Korea—and also Vietnam in Southeast Asia—all
absorbed and refined Confucian values and concepts of authority. But because of their
individual cultural traditions, they also had their separate versions of Confucianism, which
increasingly diverged as each country followed a different path to political modernization.”).
65. See BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 54 (noting that the
use of the term “values in Asia” “is sensitive to the pluralism of values within Asia yet retains
the implication that such values can pose challenges to Western liberal approaches to human
rights”); Peerenboom, supra note 22, at 7 (noting such a possible distinction in the human
rights context but observing the many problems that will arise even with the use of the term
“values in Asia”).
66. Tay, supra note 23, at 747; see also BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION,
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relativist theories . . . are tautological and overly deterministic because
they fail to appreciate the roles of both human agency and institutions in
67
The “Asian
the transformative processes of cultural discourse.”
values” debate also ignores the fact that “there are different views of
human rights voiced in Asia, by opposition politicians, scholars, and
68
non-government organizations.”
A case in point is the Bangkok Non-Governmental Organizations
69
Declaration of March 27, 1993, which contrasted significantly with the
Bangkok Declaration—to be more precise, the Bangkok Governmental
Declaration. As Simon Tay reminded us:
[t]he N.G.O. Declaration differs significantly both from the
Bangkok Declaration by governments and what . . . has, for
convenience, termed the “Asian view”. Th[is] Declaration
places a stronger emphasis on civil and political rights than does
the Declaration by government representatives. It calls for
democracy to be “fostered and guaranteed in all countries” and
for Asian governments to “lift constraints on political rights . . .
by repealing repressive laws . . . and liberalising the political
system.”
Like the Bangkok Declaration by the Asian
governments, it calls for cultural rights to be recognized on the
basis that “[t]here is emerging a new understanding of
universalism encompassing the richness and wisdom of AsiaPacific cultures”. The N.G.O. Declaration explicitly stipulates,
however, that “cultural practices which derogate from
70
universally accepted human rights . . . must not be tolerated.”

supra note 24, at 50 (“[T]he dominant patterns of relationships that existed before European
imperialism transformed the region suggest that things could have developed differently.”).
As Professor Kang recounted: “The British colonized Hong Kong, the Malay peninsula,
Australia and New Zealand, Burma, India, and deeply influenced Siam [now Thailand].
France colonized much of Indochina, including Vietnam and Cambodia. The Dutch took
Indonesia, the Spanish (and then the United States) conquered the Philippines, and the
Portuguese possessed Macao.” KANG, supra note 56, at 160.
67. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture, supra note 21, at 110.
68. Tay, supra note 23, at 747.
69. The Bangkok NGO Declaration was reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 208.
70. Tay, supra note 23, at 747 (footnotes omitted); see also David Kelly, The Chinese
Search for Freedom as a Universal Value, in ASIAN FREEDOMS: THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 93, 114 (David Kelly & Anthony Reid eds., 1998) (“The
Bangkok Declaration is seriously at fault . . . in excluding the kind of voices . . . from Liang
Qichao to Bao Zunxin . . . in its account of freedom in Asia. This is in itself the most minimal
of lists, and says nothing about countries apart from China.”); Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal
Democracy and Asian Orientalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
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Indeed, the drafters of the Non-Governmental Declaration criticized
the Governmental Declaration for “reflect[ing] the continued attempt
by many Governments of the Asia-Pacific region to avoid their human
rights obligations, to put the state before the people and to avoid
acknowledging their obligations to account for their failures in the
71
promotion and protection of human rights.”
Fourth, as important as the influence of Confucianism may be in
East Asian countries—or for that matter, Islam in the Middle East—one
has to wonder whether the discussion of these influences is just based on
72
cultural stereotypes. Communitarian philosophies are not unique to
the Chinese or the Muslims; they can be found in civilizations around
73
the world. While most in Western societies would find it misleading or
overly simplistic to attribute the massive unauthorized copying problem
on the internet in their countries to the communitarian underpinnings of
Judeo-Christianity, it is equally problematic to attribute piracy and
counterfeiting in Asia to Asian cultures. Simply put, it is just misleading
and overly simplistic to describe piracy and counterfeiting as a cultural
74
problem.

supra note 26, at 27, 29 (“[T]he concept of Asian values does not convey Asian voices in their
full complexity and diversity, nor does it represent genuine Asian initiatives. Rather, it
depends on, or even abuses, the West-centric frameworks that it claims to overcome.”).
71. Nongovernmental Organizations’ Response to the Bangkok Declaration, reprinted
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 211; see also TAY,
supra note 20, at 12 (“While perhaps having some merit, the Asian values argument was
suspect because its spokesmen were often politicians or officials associated with more
authoritarian governments and regimes. It was suspected to be a relatively sophisticated
argument to justify existing power structures.”).
72. Simon Tay made a similar observation. See Tay, supra note 23, at 747 (“Critics [of
the cultural argument] will say the Asian view tends to generalizations and stereotypes of
what is ‘Asian.’”).
73. See REIN MÜLLERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY 87 (1997) (“The West has
had its own communitarian phases of development and communitarian ideas and practices
can still be found in some sectors of Western society. . . . And currently, many people in the
West are thinking of how to put some limits on individualism, which, while being necessary
for human liberation and economic development, may become excessive and indeed
constitute a threat for both liberty and economic development.”); Aryeh Neier, Asia’s
Unacceptable Standard, FOREIGN POL’Y, Autumn 1993, at 42, 42 (“Hong Kong’s
entrepreneurs, who have made that colony an outstanding economic success, are as
individualistic as their Western counterparts. And seminal figures in the development of the
West’s rights-based traditions, such as John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, also had their
communitarian sides.”).
74. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131–34 (2003) (explaining why copyright piracy is not
merely a cultural problem).
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2. Economic Developments
Like culture, the economic and technological developments in Asia
75
have been highly diverse and uneven. As David Llewellyn reminded
us in his recent book, Invisible Gold in Asia:
The term “Asia” was originally a Western concept to describe
the eastern part of the land mass of Eurasia separated from
Europe by the Ural Mountains—or, as the ancient Greeks would
have said, “everything east of Greece.” It incorporates a number
of regions and peoples from vastly varied civilisations. It is likely
that the peoples of ancient Asia themselves, such as the Chinese,
75. As Mark Beeson pointed out:
In the Asia-Pacific, . . . there is a far greater range of potential members in terms of
their respective levels of economic development and organization, political practices
and structures of government, and even in their respective cultural traditions and
backgrounds, something that reduces the ability to act in concert as a consequence.
There are dramatic differences in the size of the economies of APEC’s members . . .
before we even begin to think about the way such economies are organized at the
political level or integrated into wider structures of international governance,
development and security.
BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 4. Similarly, Yash Ghai
noted:
The economic and political systems in Asia show a remarkable diversity, ranging
from semi-feudal kingdoms in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, through military
dictatorships in Burma and Cambodia, effectively one-party regimes in Singapore
and Indonesia, communist regimes in China and Vietnam, ambiguous democracies
in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, to well-established democracies like India. There are
similarly differences in their economic systems, ranging from tribal subsistence
economies in parts of Indonesia through highly developed market economies of
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan and the mixed economy model of India, to the
planned economies of China and Vietnam.
Yash Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 54, 54–55; see also BEESON, REGIONALISM AND
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at xiv (“[I]f there is one observation that is always made
about East Asia it is about its diversity.”); id. at 116 (“Heterogeneity may be the leitmotif of
East Asia, but the diversity of political systems found in Southeast Asia makes generalization
difficult, if not foolhardy.”); ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIAN
EMERGING ECONOMIES 3 (2010) (stating that “it is never easy to jumble all Asian nations
together and establish their economic and technological needs and how they might resolve
any attendant problems”); TAY, supra note 20, at 19 (“The region has no single, strong, and
enduring history of unity and accepted commonality, whether in polity, culture, language, or
religion.”); id. at 38 (“Any claim by one Asian country would be met with vehement denials
from others. Asia is a region that is not only diverse but divided by tensions and unsettled
questions.”); Christoph Antons, Analyzing Asian Law: The Need for a General Concept, 13
LAW IN CONTEXT 106 (1995) (discussing the challenges in analyzing Asian law in light of the
diverse historical and sociological backgrounds); Christopher Heath, Intellectual Property
Rights in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA, supra note 57, at 3, 5 (noting the
lack of common cultures, religions, and colonial backgrounds in Asia).
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Indians, Japanese, Persians and Arabs, did not conceive the idea
of Asia because they did not view themselves collectively in the
76
way Europeans did.
For analytical convenience, the United Nations Statistics Division
divides Asia into five different macro sub-regions: (1) central Asia; (2)
eastern Asia; (3) southern Asia; (4) south-eastern Asia; and (5) western
Asia. Table 1 lists the different countries included in the U.N.
geoscheme. Although the Statistics Division stated explicitly that “[t]he
assignment of countries or areas to specific groupings is for statistical
convenience and does not imply any assumption regarding political or
77
other affiliation of countries or territories by the United Nations,” the
classification makes salient the challenges in determining at the outset
which countries are to be analyzed for the purposes of identifying panAsian positions in intellectual property law and policy.

76. DAVID LLEWELLYN, INVISIBLE GOLD IN ASIA: CREATING WEALTH THROUGH
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY xiv-xv (2010); accord DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26,
at 2 (“In historical fact, while the diverse cultures of Asia are each to some degree
multicultural (that is, the product of long cultural interactions), there was, until modern times,
no consciousness among them of a shared Asian identity . . . . Traditionally the distinct
civilizations of Asia did not identify themselves with a common continental culture, whatever
the religious bonds they may have shared with other Asian peoples.”); H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 303 (3d ed. 2007)
(“Asia may exist more in western thinking than in Asian, and the diversity of Asia is perhaps
greater today than it ever has been.”).
77. Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use, U.N. STATISTICS DIV.,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm (last revised Feb. 17, 2011).
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Central Asia

Eastern Asia

Southern Asia

Kazakhstan

China

Afghanistan

Kyrgyzstan

China, Hong Kong

Bangladesh

Tajikistan

China, Macau

Bhutan

Turkmenistan

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

India

Uzbekistan

Japan

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Mongolia

Maldives

Republic of Korea

Nepal

353

Pakistan
Sri Lanka

South-Eastern Asia

Western Asia

Brunei Darussalam

Armenia

Cambodia

Azerbaijan

Indonesia

Bahrain

Lao People’s Democratic

Cyprus

Republic

Georgia

Malaysia

Iraq

Myanmar

Israel

Philippines

Jordan

Singapore

Kuwait

Thailand

Lebanon

Timor-Leste

Occupied Palestinian Territory

Vietnam

Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

Table 1: Composition of Geographical Sub-regions in Asia (As of Feb. 17, 2011)

78. Id.

78
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Even if we limit our discussion to only eastern, southern, and southeastern Asia—or even the West-centric Far East—it remains difficult to
compare the economic developments in countries in these different subregions. Out of all the countries, Japan has the strongest and most
sophisticated economy. In Mark Besson’s view, this country is
“especially important as an exemplar of a highly successful Asian
79
state.”
Although China has recently overtaken Japan to become the world’s
second largest economy on an aggregate basis, behind only the United
80
States, Japan still dominates China dramatically on a per capita basis.
With a per capita GDP of 39,738 in 2009, Japan is one of the richest
81
developed countries. In the same period, China, by contrast, has a per
capita GDP of only 3,744. It therefore should still be classified as a low82
Indeed, China’s per capita
to-middle-income developing country.
GDP is lower than that of Malaysia and Thailand, not to mention Japan,
83
Singapore, and South Korea.
In the area of intellectual property protection, Japan has improved
considerably in the last two decades. In the early 1980s, Japan was
widely criticized for its limited intellectual property protection, due
84
largely to the United States’ trade deficit with Japan. By the time the
85
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Agreement”) was negotiated, Japan slowly assumed the role
of a key trilateral partner with the United States and the European
Communities—thanks in no small part to the push by local and foreign
86
intellectual property industries. Most recently, Japan was instrumental
79. BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 106.
80. See David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2010, at B1.
BANK,
81. GDP
Per
Capita
(Current
US$),
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter GDP Per Capita].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See MICHAEL P. RYAN, PLAYING BY THE RULES: AMERICAN TRADE POWER
AND DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC 16–17 (1995) (providing a list of Section 301 trade disputes
involving Japan from 1974 to 1989); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24 (2001) (stating that Japan was
identified as a priority foreign country under the Super 301 process for providing inadequate
market access to U.S. goods and services).
85. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
86. See generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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in driving the negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
87
(“ACTA”), a voluntary plurilateral agreement that aims to set a new
and higher benchmark for international intellectual property protection
88
and enforcement among like-minded countries.
Unlike Japan, China arrived much later in both the economic and
intellectual property scenes; it is the “new kid on the block” of the
89
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
Nevertheless, it now has
successfully established itself as a dominant Asian economic power.
Today, China is the world’s largest exporter and second largest
90
economy and trading nation.
It is also one of the world’s largest
recipients of foreign direct investment (“FDI”) with capital inflows of
about $50 billion, behind only the United States and the United
91
Kingdom.
Its factories “make 70 percent of the world’s toys, 60
percent of its bicycles, half its shoes, and one-third of its luggage. . . .
[China also] builds half of the world’s microwave ovens, one-third of its
television sets and air conditioners, a quarter of its washers, and one92
fifth of its refrigerators.”
Given China’s geopolitical importance and its immense growth
potential, some commentators have linked China to the United States,
93
creating what they have called the G-2 (Group of 2). As they argued,
G-2 is likely to be crucial to discussions on global matters, which range
from economic recovery to climate change. Some economists and
commentators also highlighted the growing economic interdependence
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 66 (2002) (examining the role of the industries in the
TRIPS negotiations); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 96–120 (2003) (same).
87. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
88. See generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011)
(criticizing the use of the “country club” approach to negotiate ACTA); Peter K. Yu, Six
Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six
Secret Fears] (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA).
89. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 352.
90. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 9
(2009).
91. Daniel Chow, The Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International Trade
and Foreign Direct Investment, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 187, 198 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007)
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH].
92. SHENKAR, supra note 4, at 2–3.
93. Compare BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 90, at 25 (noting the need for China and
the United States to “develop a very informal but increasingly effective ‘G-2’ . . . to help
guide the global governance process on an increasing number of economic topics”), with
HALPER, supra note 9, at 216–18 (arguing against the elevation of the U.S.-China relations to
the bilateral status of a special G2 relationship).
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between China and the United States by alluding to “a chain-gang
94
relationship” between the two countries, or what Niall Ferguson and
95
Moritz Schularick have described as “Chimerica.”
In the intellectual property area, China’s developments have also
96
been quite impressive, especially in major cities and coastal areas.
Today, China is among the top 5 countries filing patent applications
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”) under the auspices of
97
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”). In 2010, the
number of PCT applications increased by 56.2% to 12,337, moving
China to the fourth spot, behind only the United States, Japan, and
98
Germany.
Since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, which later became the State
Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), has also been recognized as an
99
international searching authority for PCT purposes. In Peter Drahos’
view, such recognition made China “a player in the top tier of patent
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent
100
administration.”
It is therefore no surprise that, in 2007, SIPO met
with the European Patent Office, the Japanese Patent Office, the
Korean Intellectual Property Office (“KIPO”), and the United States
Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to “improv[e] the
efficiency of their examination systems and to harmonize their office
94. Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global Economy, in
CHINA’S NEW ROLE, supra note 7, at 7, 11; see also HALPER, supra note 9, at 25 (“[T]he
American and Chinese economies are heavily interdependent. America has grown addicted
to Chinese credit; China has grown equally addicted to American consumption. The depth of
this interdependence creates a relationship that is stabilized in a kind of economic version of
mutually assured destruction.”); ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND
AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT
(2009) (discussing the intertwined economic relationship between China and the United
States); Peter K. Yu, Remember that China, U.S. Need Each Other, DES MOINES REG., Feb.
22, 2009, at 4OP [hereinafter Yu, China, U.S. Need Each Other] (noting this “chain-gang
relationship”).
95. Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, ‘Chimerica’ and the Global Asset Market
Boom, 10 INT’L FIN. 215 (2007).
96. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 15, at 185–88 (tracing the development of the
intellectual property regime in China); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 15, at 975–
99 (examining the progress China has made in the intellectual property arena).
97. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], International Patent Filings
Recover in 2010, http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0004.html (Feb. 9,
2011).
98. Id. The 2010 figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany were 44,855,
32,156, and 17,171, respectively.
99. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES
AND THEIR CLIENTS 233 (2010).
100. Id.
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101

systems.”
While piracy and counterfeiting problems remain, China has begun
to make a pro-active move from the imitation model to a new
102
innovation model.
The State Council’s recently adopted National
Intellectual Property Strategy, for example, seeks to strengthen the
103
country’s indigenous and innovative capacities. The strategy strongly
indicates the leaders’ growing understanding of the important role
intellectual property protection and enforcement play in driving a
104
country’s economy.
Like China, India has very impressive economic and technological
developments. Thus far, this other BRICS country has yet to compete
effectively against China, in part due to the problems with its poor
infrastructure, bureaucratic red tape, and failure to attract a substantial
105
amount of FDI. However, India, which already has the world’s second
largest population, is catching up fast and possesses strengths that China
may not have—for example, a younger workforce with a good command
of English, higher population growth, superior capital efficiency, strong
106
investment growth potential, and entrepreneurship.
Some
101. Id. at 236.
102. See generally LI YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF
PATENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (2010) (discussing
China’s move from an imitation model to an innovation model).
103. See STATE COUNCIL, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY (2008), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm.
104. See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1123
(2011) (considering it highly encouraging that China now understands the importance of
domestic innovation); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 189–96 (noting
the need to convince Chinese leaders why intellectual property protection will benefit China).
105. See Pete Engardio, Introduction to CHINDIA: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE
REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS 27 (Pete Engardio ed., 2006) [hereinafter
CHINDIA] (noting “India’s decrepit infrastructure [and] bureaucratic red tape”); The Rise of
India, in CHINDIA, supra, at 45, 49 (“[C]ompared to China with its modern infrastructure
and disciplined workforce, India is far behind in exports and as a magnet for foreign
investment.”); see also ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE
OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US 57 (2007) (“China is winning
the sprint, and [India is] going to win the marathon.” (quoting Kamal Nath, India’s minister
of commerce and industry)). But see id. at 154 (“China has proved so much more efficient
than India at development and managing its economy that th[e] scenario [that India’s
economy will overtake China’s] is unlikely unless China falls into political turmoil.”).
106. See Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, in CHINDIA, supra note 105,
at 27 (discussing India’s strengths vis-à-vis China); The Rise of India, supra note 105, at 50
(noting the “deep source of low-cost, high-IQ, English-speaking brainpower [that] may soon
have a more far-reaching impact on the U.S. than China”). As one commentator observed
interestingly:
Chinese analysts argue that because India’s salaries are lower, costs are
cheaper, thereby making Indian products more competitive. Language is also a
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commentators even predicted that India will overtake China
107
economically in the second half of this century.
Within the intellectual property area, India has also garnered
significant attention. The strength of its software industry speaks for
108
itself.
Its generic pharmaceutical industry, which features such
companies as Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, is also considered
109
one of the most important and sophisticated in the world.
Because
110
India “makes more than a fifth of the world’s generic drugs” and
eighty-five percent of generic HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals in Sub-Saharan
111
Africa, commentators have noted the significant impact a reduced
supply of Indian generic drugs will have on the global access to essential
112
medicines in the less developed world.
In December 2007, India finally joined China, Japan, and South
Korea in having its patent office designated as an international
113
searching authority. As of this writing, India has yet to conclude an
factor. Chinese businessmen fear that U.S. businesses will prefer Indian
products because of the Indian facility with English. In a strange turn of events,
the Chinese population is now asking whether their market is likely to be
flooded with cheap Indian goods.
Lal, supra note 57, at 141.
107. See, e.g., The Rise of Chindia, in CHINDIA, supra note 105, at 13, 14 (“Until now,
China has attained dramatically higher growth. But some experts believe India’s superior
capital efficiency, higher population growth, and younger workforce mean growth is more
sustainable and will enable India to surpass China in economic growth in the coming
decades.”); Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, supra note 106, at 27 (discussing
the different factors that may enable India to surpass China).
108. See generally Suma S. Athreye, The Indian Software Industry, in FROM
UNDERDOGS TO TIGERS: THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN
BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA, IRELAND, AND ISRAEL 7–40 (Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella
eds., 2006) (discussing the rise and growth of the Indian software industry).
109. See generally SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICALS
INDUSTRY: PATENT PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 180–221 (2005)
(discussing the growth and prospects of generic drug exports from India).
110. KAMAL NATH, INDIA’S CENTURY 110 (2008).
111. Colleen Chien, HIV/AIDS Drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and
Generic
Supply
Compare?,
2
PLOS
ONE
e278
(2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009287.
112. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Shadlen, Is AIDS Treatment Sustainable?, in THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES (Obijiofor Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., forthcoming 2012)
(“[I]t is estimated that more than half of those receiving AIDS treatment in the developing
world are treated with generic [antiretrovirals] produced in India.”); Yu, Access to Medicines,
supra note 6, at 388–89 (noting that the picture “may change as generic manufacturers in the
BRICS countries, such as those in India, become more active in developing on-patent drugs,
partly as a result of the TRIPs Agreement”).
113. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India Recognised as
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agreement with the International Bureau of WIPO. In the future, India
is likely to join China, Japan, and South Korea to become countries with
a large volume of PCT applications.
If these accomplishments are not enough, India, along with Brazil,
has been the undisputed leader of the developing world in international
114
intellectual property discussions. For example, before the adoption of
the TRIPS Agreement, India demanded the revision of both the Berne
115
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the
116
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the two
117
leading international intellectual property conventions. The goodwill
and leadership they developed in this early period continue even today.
Although it remains unclear whether “India and Brazil are prepared to
provide the general leadership on intellectual property issues that they
118
once did,” India is likely to continue to feature prominently in
119
regional and international intellectual property debates.
Outside these three powerful Asian economies, Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are in a league of their own.
Commentators have described these countries and regions as newly
industrialized economies, the “four little dragons,” or the “four Asian
120
tigers.” Consider South Korea, for example. The country already has
a highly successful home electronics industry that produces many
innovative products; Samsung remains a household name in the West.
In 2007, “Korea ranked fourth in the . . . International Patent
Applications statistics, occupying 4.47% of global patents. . . . Korea

International Searching Authority and International Preliminary Examining Authority,
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=34113 (Dec. 18, 2007).
114. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 350–51 (discussing India’s historical
role as a leader in the less developed world and its active lobbying on behalf of these
countries for lower intellectual property protection and special and differential treatment).
115. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971).
116. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
117. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 351 (discussing India’s demands for
special concessions in the international copyright and patent systems).
118. Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 765 (2002) [hereinafter Drahos, Developing
Countries].
119. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 351 (“[M]any of [the BRICS]
countries, like China and India, are still very eager to take up the role of regional power, if
not a world power. So, there is still a very good chance that their interests in geopolitics may
spill over into the politics of intellectual property rights.”).
120. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 33, at 5; LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 137.
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[also] had the highest number of resident patent applications filed per
121
billion dollars of GDP and per million dollars of R&D expenditures.”
Moreover, KIPO has been very active in recent years. With the
Japanese Patent Office and China’s SIPO, KIPO formed the Asian
Trilaterals, which regularly engage in policy dialogues among Asian
122
patent offices.
KIPO now “has superhighway arrangements in place
with the Japanese Patent Office . . . and the [U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office], and it is also moving into a superhighway arrangement with the
123
Danish [Patent Office].” Most recently, South Korea completed a free
trade agreement with the United States, which is pending Congressional
124
Included in the agreement is an extensive intellectual
approval.
property chapter that seeks to align the country’s intellectual property
125
standards with those of the United States.
Like South Korea, Singapore has entered into a free trade
126
agreement with the United States. In fact, Singapore was one of the
first Asian countries to enter into such a bilateral agreement.
Singapore’s emphasis on the development of a knowledge-based
127
economy is understandable. Being a small, but highly urbanized city
128
state that focuses primarily on foreign investment, exports of high121. Ji-Hyun Park, South Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA: LAW,
ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND POLITICS 259, 275 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph Straus eds., 2009)
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA] (footnote omitted). See generally Keun
Lee & Yee Kyoung Kim, IPR and Technological Catch-Up in Korea, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
STUDY 133 (Hiroyuki Odagiri et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP] (examining how South Korea caught up in the
field of intellectual property and technological development).
122. DRAHOS, supra note 99, at 233.
123. Id. at 239 (footnote omitted).
124. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Rep., Signed Legal Texts
Related to U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2011/february/signed-legal-texts-related-us-korea-trade-agreeme (Feb. 10, 2011).
125. Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement, S. Korea-U.S., ch. 18, May 6, 2003,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final
Texts/asset upload file708 4036.pdf [hereinafter KORUS FTA].
126. United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final
Texts/asset upload file708 4036.pdf [hereinafter USSFTA].
127. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 2010 UPDATE: THE
FUTURE
OF
GROWTH
IN
ASIA
71
(2010),
available
at
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2010/update/ado2010-update.pdf
(noting
that
“more than 80% of the population live in urban areas” in Hong Kong, Singapore, and South
Korea).
128. See BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 165 (“The
essence of the strategy the Singaporean government adopted was to make itself an attractive
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130

technology products, and a reliance on service industries, intellectual
property rights play a very important role in the country’s future
131
economic development. While Singapore has a high per capita GDP
and very high levels of intellectual property protection and
enforcement, it is also a founding member of the ASEAN, a regional
group that includes some of the weakest economies in Southeast Asia.
If it continues to stay within the group and assumes greater leadership,
it is likely to play a very important role in the development of
intellectual property law and policy in Asia.
Within ASEAN, the divergence in economic and technological
developments is the most blatant. While Singapore is no doubt the
132
economic leader in the pack, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam
are included in what the Goldman Sachs analysts have termed the N-11
investment location for mobile international capital.”); LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 157
(“Up to the late 1980s the principal driver for [Singapore’s] spectacular growth was foreign
direct investment in manufacturing for companies based overseas, particularly in electronics,
engineering, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.”); Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Singapore, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA, supra note 121, at 233, 235 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph
Straus eds., 2009) (“The strategy [for Singapore] was to embark on an industrialization
programme that was export-oriented. Foreign investors were actively wooed to develop their
manufacturing operations in Singapore for export to world markets—both in low-technology,
labour-intensive industries (e.g., textile, garment, and toy factories were set up by Hong Kong
and Taiwanese businesses) and in higher-technology industries.”); see also BEESON,
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 164 (“In Singapore’s case, its
geographical location at the cross-roads of Asian trade and its historical role as a crucial
entrepôt of the British empire meant that it was well placed to take advantage of the
expanding world economy.”); Alban Kang, Singapore, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
OF EAST ASIA 323, 323 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997) (noting Singapore’s
historical role as “a trading outpost for the British” during colonial times).
BANK,
129. See
High-Technology
Exports
(Current
US$),
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter High-Technology Exports] (reporting that high-technology exports accounted for
51% of exports manufactured in Singapore in 2008).
BANK,
130. See
Trade
in
Services
(%
of
GDP),
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)
(reporting that trade in services accounted for 95.1% of Singapore’s GDP in 2009); Ng-Loy,
supra note 128, at 240 (“Singapore’s economic planning for the 1990s included strategies to
promote the service sector together with manufacturing, to deepen the technology base, and
to create an ‘external’ economy through globalization. The idea behind the strategy to
deepen the technology base in Singapore was to move Singapore up the value-chain in
manufacturing, especially in emerging fields such as biotechnology, and to attract research
and development (R&D) activities.”).
131. GDP Per Capita, supra note 81.
132. See Dean A. DeRosa, US Free Trade Agreements with ASEAN, in FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 117, 163 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004)
(“Singapore is economically the strongest AEAN country, but unlike its ASEAN partners it
is not an agriculture-exporting country.”).
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(Next Eleven) countries, along with other Asian economies such as
133
Like the BRICS
Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea.
countries, this group of large developing countries has the potential to
134
pose considerable challenge to major developed economies.
Meanwhile, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, the three new ASEAN
members, remain least developed countries—similar to such other
Asian neighbors as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and
135
Timor-Leste.
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), for
example, will not be fully implemented in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
Vietnam until 2015, five years after the full implementation in the
ASEAN-6 countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
136
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).
The ASEAN members have
also received benefits under the Early Harvest Program in ACFTA,
which provides for the early opening of markets for specific goods and
137
services in China.
In sum, there are significant differences over the economic and
technological developments within Asia. Table 2 further identifies the
considerable variations in technological developments and innovation
capabilities. Because economic developments have heavily influenced
the state of intellectual property protection and enforcement, the wide
diversity of regional developments virtually guarantees the nonexistence of any established consensus on intellectual property law and
133. See Jim O’Neill et al., How Solid Are the BRICs? 7–8 (Goldman Sachs, Global
Economics Paper No. 134, 2005) (advancing the concept of the N-11 countries in response to
questions concerning whether there are more “BRICs” out there).
134. See id. at 7.
135. Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, Least
Developed Countries—Country Profiles, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH REP. FOR THE LEAST
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2011). Laos and Myanmar joined ASEAN on July 23, 1997, while Cambodia joined on April
30, 1999.
About ASEAN, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/
about_ASEAN.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
136. Dorothy-Grace Guerrero, China’s Rise and Increasing Role in Asia, in CHINA’S
NEW ROLE, supra note 7, at 191, 193.
137. See Michael A. Glosny, Stabilizing the Backyard: Recent Developments in China’s
Policy Toward Southeast Asia, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 7, at
150, 173 (“Initiatives like the [ASEAN-China Free Trade Area] and Early Harvest Program
. . . were designed to give ASEAN states a preferential opportunity to penetrate the China
market.”); Guerrero, supra note 136, at 193 (“[The Early Harvest Program] grants three-year
duty-free entry for ASEAN goods into the Chinese markets. After this, China’s
manufactured goods will have full free tariff access to Southeast Asian markets.”); Wang
Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations–China Free Trade Agreement, in BILATERAL
AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 192, 198 (Simon Lester & Bryan
Mercurio eds., 2009) (discussing the Early Harvest Program in the ASEAN-China Free Trade
Area).
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policy in Asia. Indeed, intellectual property developments vary
significantly within Asia. As Professor Llewellyn observed:
Countries around Asia feature in every different category of IPR
development: from the advanced relying on its own innovation
and creativity (Japan), to those moving—at varying speeds—
from imitator to innovator (China, India, Taiwan and South
Korea); those aiming to use in the development of their own
Invisible Gold the technology and known-how introduced by
foreign investors (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand);
to the newly industrialising countries . . . still highly dependent
on foreign technology and assistance (Vietnam, Cambodia and
138
Laos).

138. LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 117.
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GDP

Domestic

Domestic

R&D

High-tech

Researchers

S&T

p capita
(US$)140

Pat
Apps141

TM
Apps142

Expend.
(%GDP)143

Exports
(US$M)144

in R&D
(mil)145

Journal
Articles146

139. As the World Bank explained:
GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in
current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic
currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the
official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign
exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/
GDP
(Current
US$),
WORLD
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
140. As the World Bank explained:
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
GDP Per Capita, supra note 81.
141. “Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent
Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office for exclusive rights for an
invention. . . .” Patent Applications, Residents, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/IP.PAT.RESD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
142. “Trademark applications filed are applications to register a trademark with a
national or regional Intellectual Property . . . office. . . .
Direct resident trademark
applications are those filed by domestic applicants directly at a given national IP office.”
BANK,
Trademark
Applications,
Direct
Resident,
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.TMK.RESD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
143. “Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures
(both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge,
including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new
applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development.”
BANK,
Research
and
Development
Expenditure
(%
of
GDP),
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
144. “High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.
Data are in current U.S. dollars.” High-Technology Exports, supra note 129.
145. “Researchers in R&D are professionals engaged in the conception or creation of
new knowledge, products, processes, methods, or systems and in the management of the
projects concerned. Postgraduate PhD students . . . engaged in R&D are included.”
BANK,
Researchers
in
R&D
(Per
Million
People),
WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
146. “Scientific and technical journal articles refer to the number of scientific and
engineering articles published in the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry,
mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth
and space sciences.”
Scientific and Technical Journal Articles, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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GDP

Domestic

p capita
(US$)

Pat
Apps

Domestic
TM Apps

365

R&D

High-tech

Researchers

S&T

Expend.
(%GDP)

Exports
(US$M)

in R&D
(mil)

Journal
Articles

Japan

4,552,200

35,627

367,960

114,015

3.33

122,679

5,531

55,502

China

2,256,902

1,731

93,485

593,382

1.33

214,245

853

41,604

S. Korea

844,863

17,551

122,188

99,435

2.98

83,526

3,780

16,396

India

837,195

765

4,521

73,308

0.80

3,382

137

14,635

Indonesia

285,868

1,304

234

30,734

0.05

6,571

N/A

205

Thailand

176,351

2,674

891

24,275

0.23

22,479

311

1,249

Malaysia

137,848

5,378

522

10,479

N/A

57,650

N/A

615

Singapore

125,417

29,401

569

5,067

2.30

105,077

5,575

3,611

Philippines

98,823

1,156

210

7,050

0.12

25,997

81

178

Vietnam

52,426

631

180

12,884

N/A

869

N/A

221

Cambodia

6,454

465

N/A

464

N/A

N/A

N/A

21

Laos

2,723

463

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

9

Table 2: Indicators on Technological Developments and Innovation Capabilities in
147
2005

3. Geopolitical Rivalries
While culture does not provide the underlying intellectual property
values, and the region’s highly uneven economic and technological
developments have made it difficult to achieve a consensus,
148
geographical rivalries—and the lack of a regional hegemon —have
made it difficult for Asia to develop unified positions on intellectual
property law and policy. Indeed, such rivalries continue to dominate
147. 2005 was selected to maximize the amount of data available for comparison
purposes. It is important to remember that, in the past few years, technological and
innovation capabilities have increased dramatically in many fast-growing Asian countries
such as China and India.
148. Regional hegemony is important because it gives countries the power to shape
regional laws, policies, and developments according to its own interests. Nevertheless,
commentators remain skeptical that any Asian country can become a hegemon in the region.
See KANG, supra note 56, at 171 (“Given the changes in the international system and the
central place of the United States there is almost no chance that China will become the
unquestioned hegemon in East Asia.”); see also Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 953, 1022 (2011) (noting that the development of a unified Asian position
down the road is rather unlikely).
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the interactions among countries within the region.
Since the explosion of the Chinese economy, commentators have
149
suggested a growing rivalry in Asia between China and Japan.
This
rivalry is not new; it dates back to at least the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, China was fairly weak in the twentieth century, following
repeated attacks by imperialist powers. Mao’s autarky, self-reliance,
and import substitution policies also made China backward, leaving the
country with limited foreign technology and capital while isolating it
150
from the international community.
In recent years, however, the rivalries between China and Japan
have become more apparent, thus raising concerns among their Asian
neighbors. A case in point is the disagreement between the two
countries over the acceptable participants of the 2005 East Asian
151
Summit.
This disagreement foreshadowed the growing rivalry and a
deepening conflict between China and Japan. Other early signals of this
rivalry include
Beijing’s blockage of the possibility of Japan having a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council; their competing claims to
petroleum deposits and islands in the East China Sea; and
China’s irritation at the visits of former Prime Minister Koizumi
to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead, 14 of whom are
regarded as war criminals by China and South Korea, were
152
buried.
Despite this rivalry, the ongoing push for initiatives under ASEAN+3
(an ad hoc group that includes ASEAN, China, Japan and South
Korea), ASEAN+6 (an ad hoc group that includes ASEAN+3,
Australia, New Zealand, and India), and the proposed China–Japan–
South Korea free trade agreement seems to suggest that “China
understands that the future of the region depends upon a constructive
153
relationship between China and Japan.”
149. For a discussion of China’s relations with Japan, see generally ROBERT G.
SUTTER, CHINA’S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS 125–50 (2005). For a timely
collection of essays on the implications of China’s rise for the balance of influence in Asia, see
generally CHINA’S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA (William W. Keller &
Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) [hereinafter BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA].
150. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 198.
151. See Guerrero, supra note 136, at 192 (“The rift in the first [East Asian Summit]
was the tip of the iceberg that is the Sino-Japanese conflict.”).
152. Id. at 192.
153. Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China’s Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT:
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Regardless of whether China can work closely with Japan, the wide
differences in economic and technological developments in the two
countries will continue to make it difficult for them to reach a consensus
over issues related to intellectual property law and policy. It is one
thing to have no major conflict between these two countries, but it is
quite another thing to have the two countries coordinating their
positions on intellectual property law and policy.
India also plays a very important role in Asia’s future development.
As Robert Kagan put it, “In Asia . . . it is a three-way, not a two-way,
154
competition.”
Indeed, the rapidly-changing dynamics in the Indian
155
economy and the country’s domestic industries have presented some
interesting twists to the future position of this traditional vanguard of
the developing world. India has also been actively establishing bilateral
156
and regional trade agreements while being instrumental in the
CHINA AND ASIA’S NEW DYNAMICS 48, 55 (David Shambaugh ed., 2006).
154. ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 41
(2009); see also BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 88 (“[B]oth
India and China have the potential to redefine the balance of influence and power within any
grouping of which they are a part and the very definition of the region any new institution
claims to represent.”); see also Jason Burke, India’s Deals with Sri Lanka Heighten Stakes in
‘Great Game’ with Beijing, GUARDIAN (London) (June 9, 2010, 11:45 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/09/sri-lanka-india-china-great-game (“China wants
to be the pre-eminent power in Asia and whether Asia ends up multipolar or unipolar will be
determined by what happens in the Indian Ocean. Currently there is a power vacuum there
and the Chinese want to fill it.” (quoting Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies,
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi)).
155. See, e.g., Dwijen Rangnekar, Context and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A
Comment on Amending India’s Patent Act, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365, 379–80 (2007)
(discussing the changing dynamics of the Indian pharmaceutical industry).
156. As one commentator observed:
The Indian government has negotiated a framework agreement with ASEAN whose
ambition and scope resemble the China-ASEAN agreement. It has also negotiated
an economic cooperation agreement with Singapore, which could be a launching
pad of sorts for an India-ASEAN FTA. An FTA with Thailand is also joining the
list. Thanks to these and other diplomatic efforts, New Delhi now holds its own
annual summit meeting with ASEAN in an “ASEAN + 1” arrangement, and India
was included in the December 2005 East Asian Summit.
Ellen L. Frost, China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat?, in BALANCE OF
INFLUENCE IN ASIA, supra note 149, at 95, 99 (footnote omitted); see also Julia Ya Qin,
China, India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER 167, 196 (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (“It was not
until recent years that India began to enter into regional free trade arrangements with others,
mostly its neighbouring countries.”); Wang Jiangyu, The Role of China and India in Asian
Regionalism, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra, at 333,
356–58 (discussing India’s regional trade initiatives). But see TAY, supra note 20, at 64
(“[India] has negotiated a free trade agreement with ASEAN, but this was subject to much
haggling that showed not just economic differences but also that India has not observed and
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continued development of the IBSA trilateral cooperation, featuring
157
India, Brazil and South Africa.
Asian countries increasingly see the benefits of having India
embraced a greater role in regional policy. Some countries, for
example, found it desirable to include India in the East Asian Summit to
158
“provide a ‘hedge’ against Chinese dominance.”
Many Asian
countries have also been frustrated by the “influx of cheap Chinese
consumer goods, competition for export markets, . . . growing trade
159
160
deficit[s],”
and diversion of FDI.
Indeed, “Malaysian and
Indonesian workers are [now] complaining about jobs being lost to
Chinese workers because of the closing of enterprises that are losing
161
orders to China.”
Finally, one cannot ignore the important role the United States has
absorbed the social norms prevailing in ASEAN, and perhaps does not want to. As a result,
India remains peripheral relative to others.”).
157. As stated in IBSA’s website:
Established in June 2003, IBSA [the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum] is
a coordinating mechanism amongst three emerging countries, three multiethnic and
multicultural democracies, which are determined to contribute to the construction of
a new international architecture, to bring their voice together on global issues and to
deepen their ties in various areas. IBSA also opens itself to concrete projects of
cooperation and partnership with less developed countries.
IBSA Trilateral Official Website: About IBSA, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/ (last visited Dec.
8, 2011).
158. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 88; see also TAY,
supra note 20, at 89 (“More and more are talking not of a ‘Chindia’ of interdependence but of
a new Cold War between China and India.”); Guerrero, supra note 136, at 192 (“Japan and
ASEAN members that were wary of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under China’s
leadership responded to Beijing’s diplomatic offensive by proposing the inclusion for India,
Australia and New Zealand.”).
159. Joshua Eisenman, China’s Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa: Examining Beijing’s
Methods and Objectives, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 7, at 29, 42;
accord ELLIS, supra note 7, at 1 (noting the “concern at increasing volumes of competitively
priced Chinese goods, both contraband and legitimate, that are beating out the goods of Latin
American producers in their own countries and displacing them in their traditional export
markets”); Chris Alden, China’s New Engagement with Africa, in CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 7, at 213, 226 (noting the “concern posed by the
arrival of low-cost consumer goods [from China], which have enabled Africans to purchase
basic items formerly beyond their reach but that threaten local manufacturing capacity”);
Glosny, supra note 137, at 156 (“ASEAN states are worried that with China’s low-cost and
increasingly efficient manufacturing sector, cheaper Chinese goods will flood their domestic
markets and compete effectively with Southeast Asian-produced goods in other markets.”);
see also TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA, supra note 7, at 63–86 (discussing the
impact of cheap Chinese goods in Africa).
160. See Glosny, supra note 137, at 159–60 (discussing ASEAN’s concerns over
diversions of foreign direct investments).
161. Guerrero, supra note 136, at 194.
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historically played in Asia, even though the country is not on the
162
continent. In the last few years, the Obama administration has shown
a greater interest in Asia than its predecessor. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, for instance, set the precedent by choosing to visit Asia over
163
Europe or the Middle East in her first overseas trip.
In a speech in
Tokyo, President Obama also described the United States as an “Asia
164
Pacific nation.” As he declared: “As a[n] Asia Pacific nation, the
United States expects to be involved in the discussions that shape the
future of this region, and to participate fully in appropriate
165
organizations as they are established and evolve.”
In fact, there have now been growing discussions about the potential
rivalry in Asia between China and the United States. Nevertheless, if
such rivalry intensifies, it is very likely that Asian countries will be
highly reluctant to enter into situations where they have to pick between
the two countries. As David Shambaugh pointed out:
[H]aving to choose between Beijing and Washington as a
primary benefactor is the nightmare scenario for the vast
majority of Asian states. . . . It is not an exaggeration that all
Asian states shall seek to have sound, extensive, and cooperative
relations with both the United States and China, and thus will do
166
much to avoid being put into a bipolar dilemma.
Despite these concerns, there is no denying that if there is a power shift
between the China and the United States, Asian countries will have “a
critical role [to play] in deciding whether such a shift in the relative
standing of the world’s two largest economies will be orderly or

162. Cf. TAY, supra note 20, at 6 (“Despite increased trade and economic integration
among Asian countries, . . . the United States remains the final market for as much as 60
percent of Asian production.”).
163. See Yu, China, U.S. Need Each Other, supra note 94; see also BERGSTEN ET AL.,
CHINA’S RISE, supra note 90, at ix (noting that Clinton’s trip to Asia “is the first time in
decades that the maiden foreign trip by the Secretary of State in a new administration was to
Asia and signaled the importance the Obama administration attaches to relations with the
region”).
164. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 14,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barackobama-suntory-hall.
165. Id.
166. David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics, in
POWER SHIFT, supra note 153, at 1, 17; accord Frost, supra note 156, at 105 (noting that Asian
counties “do not wish to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington”).
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167

traumatic.”
In sum, the uncertainty within the region and the continuous rivalry
among the Asian powers—or Asia Pacific powers, if the United States is
168
included —have made it difficult for Asian countries to foster panAsian positions on intellectual property law and policy. In the near
future, Asian countries are very unlikely to play a role that is similar to
that of the European Union or the African Group.
III. CHINDIASEAN
Although Part I has shown that distinct values, approaches, or
practices unlikely exist in the area of intellectual property protection
and enforcement, questions remain regarding whether Asian countries
will eventually develop unified positions on intellectual property law
and policy. While the existence of Asian values, approaches, or
practices may help develop such positions, such development does not
depend on the existence of those values, approaches, or practices. The
question, therefore, is not whether those values, approaches, or
practices exist, but whether intellectual property values, approaches, or
169
practices can be Asianized.
To date, countries in different parts of the world have taken
coherent positions as a regional group. The textbook examples are the
African Group and the European Union. Thus far, the wide-ranging
regional diversity has made it difficult for Asian countries to foster
common positions. For example, Japan was instrumental in establishing
the TRIPS Agreement and remains a key player in the push for
plurilateral or multilateral efforts in the international intellectual
property arena. It also advanced the proposal for ACTA and now

167. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 92; cf. AMITAV
ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND
THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER 224 (2001) (“The rise of China has led to prospects
that ASEAN might either resort to balancing against, or bandwagoning with, China, the two
postures commonly found in a realist understanding of responses to rising powers.”); Frost,
supra note 156, at 116 (“Non-Chinese Asians welcome China’s new role [in Asia], but they
have no desire to be dominated by China—or by Japan or India, for that matter. They see an
actively engaged United States as a balancing and stabilizing presence that expands their
room to maneuver and their freedom to choose.”).
168. Cf. id. at 16 (noting that the question over whether it is East Asia or the Asia
Pacific “presents initial problems of organizational and analytical coherence that are not as
pronounced” in other region).
169. This question, to some extent, reminds us of what Mahathir bin Mohamad,
Malaysia’s former prime minister, sometimes called the “Asianization of Asia.” BEESON,
INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 76.
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170

serves as the agreement’s depositary.
Meanwhile, Singapore and
South Korea have entered into free trade agreements with the United
171
Because these high-income countries will benefit from
States.
stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement, they, with
the exception of the ASEAN-affiliated Singapore, are unlikely to team
up with their poorer neighbors to develop pan-Asian positions on
intellectual property law and policy.
Nevertheless, the middle- and low-income Asian countries still have
strong incentives to team up with each other to strengthen their own
positions. As I mentioned earlier, the establishment of South-South
alliances can be highly beneficial. These alliances, for example, “will
allow less-developed countries to shape a pro-development agenda,
articulate more coherent positions, or even enable these countries to
establish a united negotiating front. The[y] . . . will also help these
countries establish a powerful voice in the international debates on
172
public health, intellectual property, and international trade.”
Once Japan and South Korea are taken out, the most powerful
alliance will arise when China, India, and the ASEAN members team
up to foster common positions for the Asian developing world. Such an
alliance can be described either as the China-India-ASEAN triangle or,
173
in shorter form, Chindiasean. Chindiasean is unique, as it unites two
leading middle-income developing countries with an Asia-based
regional group. (Although Singapore is a developed economy that may
not benefit from positions taken by this regional alliance, its founding
membership and growing leadership in ASEAN and such noneconomic
considerations as security are likely to ensure Singapore to remain part
174
of the alliance. )
170. ACTA, supra note 87, art. 45.
171. See KORUS FTA, supra note 125; USSFTA, supra note 126.
172. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 370.
173. Chindiasean builds on what Pete Engardio and his colleagues at Business Week
described as Chindia. CHINDIA, supra note 105. An identical combination has also been
advanced in the form of the Asian Economic Community. See Michael Ewing-Chow &
Edrick Gao, The Asian Economic Community: ASEAN—A Building or a Stumbling Block
for China and India Economic Cooperation, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 156, at 387, 387 (“At the first East Asia Summit . . . held in
Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, outlined
his vision of an emerging Asian Economic Community . . . as including ASEAN, India and
China.”).
174. See JURGEN HAACKE, ASEAN’S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY CULTURE:
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 7 (2009) (“Singapore’s leaders have long
associated a major potential security risk with the consequences of a breakdown of the
normative framework governing sub-regional order in Southeast Asia.”). See generally id. at
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From the standpoint of international intellectual property politics,
the existence of both China and India, the two so-called BRICS
countries, are important. Since the 1960s, Brazil and India have served
as the twin leaders of the developing world in international intellectual
175
property negotiations. Although China until recently has not become
active in the international community, it has since picked up
tremendous momentum.
The existence of China and India in
Chindiasean, therefore, allows the alliance to be prominently featured
in future international intellectual property negotiations. In fact, given
the immense power of both China and India, which can only grow, any
176
Asian alliance that excludes them is unlikely to succeed.
Moreover, ASEAN can benefit from access to the Chinese and
Indian markets as well as the influx of foreign direct investment from
these two countries. Although ASEAN was constituted as a group, its
constituent countries compete more against than complement each
other. As Assafa Endeshaw noted recently:
Besides the economic structures of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand are “more competitive than
complementary . . . ASEAN economies are more complementary
to the industrial countries (as well as to the Asian [newly
industrialized economies]) than to each other. And each
ASEAN country wants to protect its domestic industries from
competition from neighbors”. The overall consequence is that
ASEAN countries, except Singapore, are “not markets for each
other’s primary products. And they cannot supply each other’s
needs for technology and capital goods” . . . .
The disparity in levels of industrialization and the
competitive standing of ASEAN economies inevitably translates
into reluctance “to share markets” but an urge to protect
“domestic industries from regional cooperation”. The less
developed of them tend to be more inward-looking and
214 (“ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture has been meant to mediate estrangement and
insecurity in Southeast Asia.”); TAY, supra note 20, at 51 (“[O]ne of the earliest
achievements of ASEAN was to avoid further confrontation among its members.”).
175. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 465, 505–07 (2009) (discussing Brazil and India’s role in pushing for reforms in the
international patent system).
176. Cf. Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 235
(2004) (“[T]he ‘China factor’ enabled the creation of the G-21 [now commonly referred to as
the G-20] . . . . [W]ith China in their ranks, the size and impact of this coalition became
unprecedented.”).
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preoccupied with the basic development problems of
unemployment, poverty and income inequality. They fear that
premature competition for their industries will result in benefits
biased in favour of the more developed members; the industrial
competence of the latter will enable them to pre-empt the high
value added industries and process if industrial location is left to
177
market forces under free trade.
The existence of ASEAN in Chindiasean is equally important. As
mentioned in Part I.C, China and India are likely to be top competitors
in Asia in the future. In fact, tension may rise when the Indian economy
178
begins to catch up with that of China. As a result, ASEAN will play
its much-needed role in serving as a mediator between the two
countries, taking advantage of its wide experience in building
179
consensus.
The inclusion of ASEAN will also build on its wide
experience in intellectual property cooperation developed through the
1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property
180
Cooperation.
177. ASSAFA, supra note 75, at 66 (footnotes omitted).
178. See Lal, supra note 57, at 142 (“[A]s India continues to grow, if China shows
reluctance to accord the country status as a peer in the international arena, the resulting
friction could lead to renewed tensions.”).
179. See ACHARYA, supra note 167, at 79 (“The ASEAN Way . . . is a claim about a
process of regional interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus
building and non-confrontation styles which are often contrasted with the adversarial
posturing, majority vote and other legalistic decision-making procedures in Western
multilateral negotiations.”); BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 2
(describing the “ASEAN Way” as an “informal, consensus-based approach to international
cooperation”); HAACKE, supra note 174, at 7 (“ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture
comprises six core norms: sovereign equality, non-recourse to the use of force and the
peaceful settlement of conflict, non-interference and non-intervention, non-involvement of
ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy, and
mutual respect and tolerance”); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note
24, at 219 (noting that there is “very little chance of regional elites losing ‘face’” in processes
conducted the ASEAN Way). See generally ACHARYA, supra note 167 (providing an
excellent discussion of ASEAN’s distinctive approach to political and security co-operation).
But see id. at 78 (conceding that the “ASEAN Way” is “a loosely used concept whose
meaning remains vague and contested”); BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC,
supra note 4, at 22 (discussing criticism that “the ASEAN way of voluntarism and consensus
. . . has made it primarily an organization dedicated to conflict avoidance rather than
resolution”); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 88 (“ASEAN
is primarily a mechanism for sidelining problems regional leaders consider politically too
difficult or sensitive.”).
180. ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, Dec. 15,
1995, available at http://www.asean.org/5179.htm. For a discussion of the Framework
Agreement by its drafter, see generally Weerawit Weeraworawit, The Harmonisation of
Intellectual Property Rights in ASEAN, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA, supra
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Moreover, as China and India continue to grow, their positions may
be closer to those of developed countries than their less developed
counterparts. Some commentators have already wondered whether the
emerging BRICS countries can continue to serve as leaders of the less
181
developed world as they once did.
The addition of ASEAN in
Chindiasean, therefore, is highly important, as the positions taken by
ASEAN are likely to be more moderate than those of the two BRICS
countries. Such moderation also resonates well with the large poor
populations within China and India, thus allowing the Chinese and
182
Indian governments to work closely with their ASEAN neighbors.
To be certain, questions remain regarding whether ASEAN
countries can become equal partners with China and India. Most of the
ASEAN members are economically weak. Those that are strong on a
per capita basis, like Singapore, have a small economy. Indeed, one of
the main concerns for any partnerships between a BRICS country and
other less developed countries is the bargaining disparity between and
183
among the parties. If the arrangement is unfair, the ultimate alliance
is unlikely to be more attractive than what the weaker countries already
get under the existing multilateral system.
Nevertheless, by combining its ten members and having an economy
184
comparable to that of China and India, ASEAN may be able to
note 57, at 247.
181. See, e.g., Drahos, Developing Countries, supra note 118, at 765 (“It is . . . not clear
that India and Brazil are prepared to provide the general leadership on intellectual property
issues that they once did.”).
182. Cf. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 389 (“[T]he wide gap between the
rich and the poor and the growing regional disparities in the BRICS countries have induced
their government leaders to develop policies to work more closely with their poorer trading
partners.”).
183. As I noted earlier:
[T]he impending challenge for these countries concerns how to set up an alliance in
a way that would prevent the BRICS countries from dominating their much weaker
and more dependent partners. After all, the former are more powerful and possess
more human capital, technical knowledge, and legal expertise. Without adequate
protection, the BRICS countries may abuse their leadership roles at the expense of
others. Thus, if the partial BRICS alliances are to be successful, it is important to
build safeguards into the alliances to protect the weaker members and to allow them
to retain their autonomy and identity. It is also important to develop trust among
the participating members so that they can work together closely without worrying
about potential exploitation.
Id (footnote omitted).
184. See ASEAN, China and India: Comparative Economic Performance, Issues and
Implications (ASEAN Secretariat, Studies Unit Paper No. 09–2006, 2006), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/19006.pdf (comparing ASEAN’s economic performance and growth
with that of China and India).
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provide the much-needed political and economic clout to balance either
China or India. The regional group also provides a multitude of votes
that are important to both countries in a “one country, one vote” system
185
under the United Nations—for example, in WIPO and UNESCO.
To China and India, the support of ASEAN members may become
even more important, as the coalition with ASEAN members would
strengthen their clout in negotiations with the United States and the
186
European Union. The combination of China, India, and ASEAN may
also provide an effective countervailing force against the continued push
for stronger global intellectual property standards by the trilateral
187
partnership of the European Union, Japan, and the United States.
Even if it fails to resist this push, Chindiasean can strategically exploit
188
the growing rifts among the three countries, thus enlarging the policy
space of the less developed world. As John Odell noted, a sophisticated
negotiation strategy includes not only tactics for building coalitions, but
also tactics “for splitting rival coalitions . . . and for defending against
189
efforts by outsiders to break one’s own.”
185. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 388 (“[N]umbers matter in a ‘one
country, one vote’ system, like WIPO and the United Nations. There are only five BRICS
countries, but many more less developed countries.”).
186. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 317
(2008) (“Through the use of a collective action mechanism, it may be possible for a country
with a certain level of immunity to share the protection with one or several countries more
susceptible to FDI economic retribution. The use of coordinated behavior may bring about a
more equitable result, so long as one is aware of the legal limits of such mechanisms and the
anticoordination strategies that may be employed by opponents of the system.”); Yu, Access
to Medicines, supra note 6, at 367 (“[T]he creation of alliances among less developed
countries will help many less developed countries combat the external pressure each country
will face on a one-on-one basis from the European Communities, the United States, or other
powerful trading partners.”).
187. Cf. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 356 (“If [a coalition among the
BRICs countries] is well built and maintained, it can even become an effective counterweight
to the trilateral cooperation among the European Communities, Japan, and the United
States, all of which were instrumental in pushing for the adoption of the TRIPs
Agreement.”).
188. See AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT AND WTO 200 (2003) (noting that
“[t]he Cairns Group utilized the rift within the US-EC with great skill”); Sonia E. Rolland,
Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
483, 503 (2007) (noting the “strategic exploitation of rifts between the United States, the EU,
and Japan”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
406–08 (2006) (noting the need to “explore the tension between the European Communities
and the United States”).
189. John S. Odell, Introduction to NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 1, 13 (John S. Odell ed., 2006).
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Within Asia, an alliance with the ASEAN members would further
strengthen their positions vis-à-vis Japan, a still dominant economic
190
power in the region.
For India, such an alliance would steer the
191
discussion away from ASEAN+3 or East Asian Community.
For
China, such an alliance would be at least as attractive as ASEAN+3,
although the resulting alliance would go in a rather different direction.
Teaming up with Japan and Korea is quite different from having an
alliance with India and ASEAN.
Notwithstanding these many benefits, there remain some
unavoidable challenges.
For example, there exist “IP-irrelevant
192
factors” that would make it difficult for these countries to cooperate
with each other, such as xenophobia, nationalism, racism, mistrust, and
193
resentment.
As I noted earlier, “[n]o matter how much more
globalized and interdependent the world has become, some countries
will always remain reluctant to cooperate with others, either because of
historical conflicts, border disputes, economic rivalries, cultural
194
differences, or spillover issues from other areas.”
Indeed, the
historical record of cooperation among less developed countries has
195
been far from promising.
190. Cf. Guerrero, supra note 136, at 191, 193.
191. See id. at 192 (discussing the developments regarding ASEAN+3, the East Asia
Community, the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the East Asian Summit).
192. “IP-irrelevant factors” are those factors that are largely unaffected by intellectual
property protection. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J.
827, 852–53 (2007).
193. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 393. The tension between China and
India provides a good example. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu,
Introduction and Overview, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER,
supra note 156, at 1, 12 (“China still claims the area that is Arunachal Pradesh and India
claims that some 38,000 square mile on its border are occupied by Chinese forces.”); see also
Frost, supra note 156, at 98 (“Indian officials remain suspicious of China’s intentions and
hope to track and if possible match its initiatives.”).
194. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 393.
195. See id. at 388 (“[C]oalition-building efforts put up by less developed countries
historically have failed.”); Jean Touscoz, A Changing Policy Landscape, in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS
NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT 287, 288 (Surendra J. Patel et al. eds.,
2001) (“[T]he ‘big five’ non-members of OECD (Russia, China, Brazil, India and Indonesia)
do not always act in concert; the least developed countries themselves do not present a
common front.”). As Frederick Abbott elaborated:
Over the past 50 years, there have been a number of efforts to achieve solidarity or
common positions among developing countries in international forums. At the
broad multilateral level there was (and are) the Group of 77, and the movement for
a New International Economic Order. At the regional level, the Andean Pact in the
early 1970s developed a rather sophisticated common plan to address technology
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Moreover, ASEAN members continue to compete with China and
India. As Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding leader, observed in
2004, “[w]hat will pull [ASEAN] together is the need to be sufficiently
competitive against two huge countries now in the World Trade
Organisation and wanting to industrialise and join the export markets:
196
India and China.”
There are also additional questions concerning
whether the region will have “enough political and ideological internal
coherence to allow it to facilitate and encourage the underlying
197
economic integration that has already occurred,” including regional
198
harmonization in the intellectual property area.
Nonetheless, on balance, Chindiasean seems to be beneficial to all
parties. First and foremost, such an alliance allows China, India, and
ASEAN to achieve what they alone cannot. In the near future, the
positions of China, India, and ASEAN would also remain quite close to
each other. In the area of technology transfer and technical assistance,
for example, this group of countries would “serve as worthy allies at
least until their interests grow further apart from those of their less
199
developed partners.”
Thus, it is not surprising that China and India have already begun to
coordinate their positions to maximize leverage and effectiveness of
their international negotiations. In the June 2010 meeting of the TRIPS
Council, for example, the two countries joined hands in raising concerns
200
about the development of TRIPS-plus enforcement trends.
Their
and IP issues (ie Decisions 84 and 85). Yet these efforts were largely unsuccessful in
shifting the balance of negotiating leverage away from developed countries. In fact,
developing country common efforts to reform the Paris Convention in the late 1970s
and early 1980s are routinely cited as the triggering event for movement of
intellectual property negotiations to the GATT.
Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 36,
42 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).
196. LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 121–22.
197. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 16.
198. See ASSAFA, supra note 75, at 66 (“[G]iven the wide disparity in levels of
industrialization and the competitive standing of the ASEAN economies], any IP
harmonization will clash with some of the member states’ policies of maintaining protection
of local markets and industries. This is simply because harmonization of IP will have the
inevitable effect of breaking down some of the barriers.”).
199. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 392.
200. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS
Council], Minutes of Meeting ¶¶ 248–73, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS Council
Minutes]; see also Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 518–21 (2011)
(discussing China and India’s interventions at the TRIPS Council); The Problems with the
“TRIPS plus” Enforcement Trend: China’s View, S. BULL., 28 July 2010, at 13 (collecting the
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important interventions were a direct response to the release of the
draft text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as well as the
growing concern over the systematic problems created by the high
intellectual property enforcement standards established through
201
bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements.
A few years
earlier, China and India also served as cosponsors of the proposal to
202
introduce a new article 29bis in the TRIPS Agreement, which would
create an obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of
origin of the biological resources and traditional knowledge used in
203
patent-seeking inventions.
IV. AGENDA
While the previous Part focuses on the establishment of Chindiasean
as a geopolitical alliance, this Part turns to its ability to shape global
intellectual property norms. To a large extent, Chindiasean could serve
204
as an alternative locus of intellectual property norm making. It could
also become what Professor Tay described as “Asia’s normative
205
The development of such a community is important,
community.”
because a coherent common policy agenda will help the Chindiasean
member states achieve a more powerful voice, greater political leverage,
and more desirable bargaining outcomes. The shared regional norms
will also help bind the members together, notwithstanding the
challenges mentioned earlier in the previous Part.
If Chindiasean is to pursue a coherent policy agenda, one has to
wonder what items this agenda will contain. To help identify these
speech for China’s intervention); see also TRIPS Council, Communication from India,
Intervention on TRIPS plus Enforcement Trends (June 9, 2010), reprinted in Why “IPR
Enforcement” in ACTA & FTAs Harm the South, S. BULL., 28 July 2010, at 10 (collecting the
speech for India’s intervention).
201. See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 200, ¶¶ 250, 264.
202. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru,
Thailand and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme—The Outstanding Implementation Issue on
the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Article 29bis Proposal].
203. See id. ¶ 2 (requiring patent applicants to “disclose the country providing the
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country they
were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin”).
204. Cf. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf
in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 28–29 (2011) (noting that the TransPacific Partnership Agreement has the potential to “provide an alternative power center
within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in ways that are distinct from the models
that have been jockeying for favor the past several years” (footnote omitted)).
205. TAY, supra note 20, at 150–58 (discussing Asia’s normative community).
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potential items, this Part examines issues that are of great importance to
China, India, and ASEAN. Part III.A focuses on traditional issues that
are already under discussion in the international intellectual property
arena. Part III.B discusses new issues that have only emerged recently
and on which Chindiasean could have a major impact.
A. Traditional Issues
1. Enforcement
Enforcement will remain a key issue for many Asian countries in at
least the next decade. As I noted elsewhere, the enforcement
206
mechanisms available under the TRIPS Agreement are rather weak.
In the view of developed countries and intellectual property right
207
holders, the mechanisms are just primitive, obsolete, and inadequate.
To some extent, Part III of the TRIPS Agreement can be seen as the
208
There remain many historical,
Agreement’s “Achilles’ heel.”
economic, tactical, disciplinary, and technological challenges to
improving enforcement within the WTO—or in the present context,
within Asia.
Moreover, many Chindiasean members are now on the United
States Trade Representative’s Section 301 watch list or priority watch
list (see table 3). Due to such constant external pressure, these
countries have a strong need to develop a collective response,
206. See generally Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, supra note 200, at 483–504
(discussing the weakness of the TRIPS enforcement provisions).
207. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TRADE,
STRATEGY FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THIRD
COUNTRIES
3
(2005),
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122636.pdf (“Violations of intellectual property rights (IPR)
continue to increase, having reached, in recent years, industrial proportions. This happens
despite the fact that, by now, most of the WTO members have adopted legislation
implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement.”); TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E.
ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS 4 (2008)
(noting that “it has become apparent to some national governments and regional
organizations that the ‘aggressive’ enforcement provisions of TRIPS, particularly the border
measures, have fallen short of expectations of providing an effective system of thwarting
international movement of infringing goods”); Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Property
Enforcement: A Reality Gap (Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 47 (2008) (discussing the inadequacies of the
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and explaining the need for TRIPS-plus
bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the area of border enforcement).
208. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement:
The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 34 (1998); Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel,
supra note 200.
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coordinate negotiation and litigation strategies, and establish a forum
for sharing experience, knowledge, and best practices. A more
coordinated regional approach toward intellectual property
enforcement therefore will benefit all Chindiasean members.
Country

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Brunei

2009

2010

2011

WL

WL

WL

China

306

306

306

306

OCR

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

India

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWLL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

Indonesia

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

WL

WL

PWL

PWL

PWL

Malaysia

PWL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

Pakistan

WL

WL

WL

PWL

PWL

WL

WL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

Philippines

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

S. Korea

PWL

WL

WL

PWL

WL

WL

WL

WL

Taiwan

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

WL

WL

WL

WL

Thailand

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

PWL

Vietnam

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL

WL=“Watch List” PWL=“Priority Watch List” 306=Section 306 Review OCR=Out-of-Cycle Review
209

Table 3: United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 Actions

2. Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions
The protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions is
of great importance to many Asian countries. India, for example, is
concerned about protecting its traditional knowledge, cultural heritage,
210
and genetic resources.
Its biodiversity law remains one of the most
211
comprehensive and well-drafted laws in the region. Meanwhile, China

209. The data were taken from the annual Special 301 reports issued by the Office of
the United States Trade Representative.
210. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 76 (2002) (discussing the controversies over patent
protection involving turmeric and the neem tree).
211. See Tanuja Garde, India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA, supra note 121,
at 55, 78 n.108 (stating that the 2002 National Biodiversity Act “addresses access to genetic
resources and associated knowledge by foreign entities to provide for benefit sharing from
the use of the resources, and also establishes the National Biodiversity Authority”).
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212

pays considerable attention to protecting traditional herbal medicines.
It has also recognized the importance of protecting intangible cultural
heritage. In February 2011, China adopted a new intangible cultural
213
heritage law.
Apart from China and India, ASEAN countries also
have important traditional knowledge and cultural expressions to
214
Examples include “headbands and skirts made from
protect.
paperbark by Dayak groups in the interior of Borneo or in the
complicated designs and weaving techniques for silk textiles, batik,
brocade weaving and embroidery in countries like Thailand and
215
Indonesia.”
In July 2006, a group of less developed countries advanced the
216
proposal for a new article 29bis of the TRIPS Agreement. Out of the
nine sponsors, five of them are from Asia (Brazil, China, India,
217
Pakistan, and Thailand). Although it is unclear how long it will take
the WTO membership to adopt this proposal, considering the large
number of countries that have yet to ratify the protocol to amend the
218
TRIPS Agreement in the public health area, the discussion of
protection for traditional knowledge and genetic resources within the
TRIPS context underscores the view that the TRIPS Agreement and the
existing international intellectual property system provide inadequate
219
protection to non-Western interests.
It is also worth noting the momentum created by the recent adoption
of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
212. See LI, supra note 102, at 35–36 (discussing the protection of traditional Chinese
medicines); Li Xuan & Li Weiwei, Inadequacy of Patent Regime on Traditional Medicinal
Knowledge—A Diagnosis of 13-Year Traditional Medicinal Knowledge Patent Experience in
China, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 125 (2007) (examining the protection of traditional
Chinese medicines).
213. Intangible Cultural Heritage Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 2011, effective June 1, 2011) (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=215503.
214. See Draft ASEAN Framework Agreement on Access to Biological and Genetic
Resources, reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA, supra note 57, at 261.
215. Christoph Antons, What Is “Traditional Cultural Expression”?—International
Definitions and Their Application in Developing Asia, 1 WIPO J. 103, 105–06 (2009).
216. Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 202.
217. Id.
218. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (Jan. 5, 2012).
219. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 192, 193 (1996)
(noting the lack of protection for “custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge,
collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable
seed varieties”).
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220

and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization.
Adopted on October 29, 2010, this new protocol aims to promote fair
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic
resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and the sustainable
221
use of biological diversity.
Like the Bonn Guidelines on Access to
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits
222
Arising out of Their Utilization, this new protocol will further
strengthen Chindiasean’s position with respect to greater disclosure in
patent applications of the traditional knowledge and genetic resources
used in patent-seeking inventions.
3. Geographical Indications
The protection of geographical indications is quite important to
many Asian countries. These countries continue to be dissatisfied with
the fact that geographical indications are protected in a manner that
favor primarily developed countries. For example, articles 22–23 of the
TRIPS Agreement provide substantial protection to geographical
223
indications for wines and spirits. Yet, they ignore the needs of many
Asian developing countries, such as the need for stronger protection for
geographical indications of food products grown primarily on their
224
soil.
220. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, Oct. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf.
221. Id. art. 1.
222. As stated in the Bonn Guidelines:
Contracting Parties with users of genetic resources under their jurisdiction should
take appropriate legal, administrative, or policy measures, as appropriate, to support
compliance with prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such
resources and mutually agreed terms on which access was granted. These countries
could consider . . . [m]easures to encourage the disclosure of the country of origin of
the genetic resources and of the origin of traditional knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities in applications for intellectual
property rights . . . .
Secretariat of the CBD, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization 16(d)(2) (2002), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf; see also BRYAN BACHNER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CHINA: THE MODERNIZATION OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE 22–23 (2009) (noting that the Bonn Guidelines were “approved by the CBD’s
Conference of Parties . . . with a view to help countries that were drafting Access and Benefit
Sharing . . . legislation”).
223. TRIPS Agreement arts. 23–24.
224. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 239 (2000) (“[T]he evolving language in TRIPS on geographical indications
remains largely . . . confined to wines and spirits, while many developing countries point to
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In recent years, many Asian countries have begun to notice the vast
225
benefits of geographical indications.
As a means to resolve the
impasse over geographical indications, Hong Kong advanced “an
alternative model for the establishment of a multilateral system of
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and
226
spirits under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement.”
Together with
other WTO members, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka also called on the
WTO to extend the protection of geographical indications from wines
227
and spirits to all products.
If the discussion of the protection for
traditional knowledge and cultural expressions is eventually tied to that
for geographical indications—arguably the most practical compromise
to link the European Union with the African Group—Asian countries
are likely to play a rather important role in establishing greater
protection for geographical indications.
4. Access to Essential Medicines
Since the expiration of the transitional period for developing
countries in the TRIPS Agreement on January 1, 2005, access to
essential medicines has been a major agenda item for any intellectual
property discussions involving the developing world. The discussion of
such access eventually culminated in the adoption of the Doha

food products that could be protected to their advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling
tea.”).
225. See, e.g., PHILIPPE CULLET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 333–37 (2005) (discussing how geographical indications can
serve as a tool for protecting traditional knowledge); Dwijen Rangnekar, Indications of
Geographical Origin in Asia: Legal and Policy Issues to Resolve, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS IN A CHANGING
WORLD 273, 273 (Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Pedro Roffe eds., 2009) (noting that
geographical indications “are increasingly being seen as useful intellectual property rights for
developing countries”); Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 97, 110 (“Mysore silk sarees . . . have had a makeover
since obtaining a geographical indication, updating [their] look with trendy new (but
interestingly, natural) colors . . . and ‘contemporary’ designs inspired by temple architecture
and tribal jewelry.”).
226. TRIPS Council, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Multilateral System of
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS
Agreement ¶ 3, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003).
227. See TRIPS Council, Proposal from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt,
Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela ¶ 20, IP/C/W/247/Rev.1 (May 17, 2001) (“The
extension of the level of protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits to
geographical indications for all other products is in the best interest and to the benefit of all
WTO Members . . . .”).
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228

Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the
229
protocol to amend the TRIPS Agreement. If ratified by two-thirds of
230
the WTO membership, the protocol will add a new article 31bis to the
TRIPS Agreement, which will allow countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of on-patent
231
pharmaceuticals.
The debate on access to essential medicines is of particular
importance to India, which has a very strong generic pharmaceutical
232
industry. It is also important to China and Thailand, which are now
major producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients and have taken on
a growing role in the generic market, not to mention the ongoing public
233
health needs in these countries and their Asian neighbors.
To the
disappointment of the multinational pharmaceutical industry, Thailand,
along with Brazil, introduced compulsory licenses to increase access to
234
needed pharmaceuticals.
If its efforts continue and spread to other
countries, the discussion of compulsory licensing arrangement in the
228. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
229. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS
Amendment].
230. Although the initial deadline for ratification was set at December 1, 2007, it has
been extended three times to December 2013. Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 218. As of this writing, more than a third of the 153 WTO member
states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and members of the European
Union, have ratified the proposed amendment.
231. See TRIPS Amendment, supra note 229; see also Yu, The International Enclosure
Movement, supra note 192, at 872–86 (tracing the development of proposed article 31bis of
the TRIPS Agreement).
232. See CHAUDHURI, supra note 109, at 180–221.
233. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 363 (“Although China has yet to be
as aggressive as India in exporting drugs or as successful as Brazil in promoting public health
within the country, it already is the world’s largest producer of active pharmaceutical
ingredients and is likely to be a very important player in the generic market.”); see also LI,
supra note 102, at 54 (“Some Chinese researchers believe that China has advantages in
producing ‘me too’ drugs because its capacity to conduct organic synthesis is very strong after
many years of China’s being the target for outsourced MPC [multinational pharmaceutical
companies’] business.”); ELLEN F.M. ’T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE
APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 67
(2009) (“[M]iddle-income developing countries are important not only for the size of their
markets but also because they have the production capacity to supply generic medicines in
the developing world.”).
234. See id. at 44–50 (discussing Brazil and Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses and
government use orders); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 192, at 843–
49 (discussing the use of compulsory licenses in Brazil).
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public health context and ways to promote innovation in the
pharmaceutical area is likely to feature prominently on Chindiasean’s
policy agenda.
5. Internet and Other New Technologies
When the TRIPS Agreement was established in the mid-1990s, just
shortly before the internet and electronic commerce entered the
mainstream, its substantive standards were set at what Daniel Gervais
described as “the highest common denominator among major
235
industrialized countries as of 1991.” As a result, the Agreement failed
to address challenges created by new technologies that emerged after
236
the completion of its primary draft, including the technological change
237
brought about by the internet and information revolution.
To date, the internet, new communications technologies, and filesharing networks have posed significant challenges to intellectual
238
property enforcement in the digital environment.
While internetrelated enforcement problems can be found everywhere, Asian
countries play a critically important role in the larger debate, for at least
three reasons.
First, China already has the world’s largest internet population,
which amounted to over 513 million users in December 2011 according

235. Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and
Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH, supra note 91, at 23, 43.
236. See id. at 29 (“The 1992 text was not extensively modified and became the basis
for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.”).
237. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 614–15 (1996) (“Despite its broad sweep
and its unstated aspirations, TRIPS arrives on the scene already outdated. TRIPS reached
fruition at the same time that the on-line era became irrevocable. Yet it makes no
concession, not even a nod, to the fact that a significant portion of the international
intellectual property market will soon be conducted on-line.”); see also J.H. Reichman, The
Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software Fared Badly, and What Are the
Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763, 766 (1995) (“[The principal weakness of the
TRIPS Agreement] stems from the drafters’ technical inability and political reluctance to
address the problems facing innovators and investors at work on important new technologies
in an Age of Information. The drafters’ decision to stuff these new technologies into the
overworked and increasingly obsolete patent and copyright paradigms simply ignores the
systemic contradictions and economic disutilities this same approach was already generating
in the domestic intellectual property systems.” (footnote omitted)).
238. For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peer-topeer technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 907 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653 (2005).
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239

to official statistics.
If the growth continues, internet-related
developments in China are likely to overwhelm that of the world. As I
have noted often, the important question about the internet in China is
not only how the internet will change China, but also how China will
240
change the internet.
Moreover, according to Internet World Stats, in December 2011,
India already has a population of over 121 million, exceeding that of
241
Japan.
For the same period, Chindiasean made up for more than a
third of the world’s internet population and has already exceeded that
of the United States and the European Union combined (see table 4). If
the growth trend continues, it is only a matter of time before
Chindiasean makes up half of the world’s internet population.

239. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 29TH STATISTICAL
SURVEY REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 4 (2012), available at
http://www1.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2012/2/27/112543.pdf [hereinafter CNNIC SURVEY
REPORT].
240. See, e.g., Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 88, at 1046.
241. Internet
Usage
in
Asia,
INTERNET
WORLD
STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
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Internet Population

Penetration Rate

China

513,100,000

38.4%

India

121,000,000

10.2%

Brunei Darussalam

318,900

79.4%

Cambodia

449,160

3.1%

Indonesia

55,000,000

22.4%

Laos

527,400

8.1%

Malaysia

17,723,000

61.7%

Myanmar

110,000

0.2%

Philippines

29,700,000

29.2%

Singapore

3,658,400

77.2%

Thailand

18,310,000

27.4%

Vietnam

30,516,587

33.7%

387

CHINDIASEAN VS WORLD / UNITED STATES / EUROPEAN UNION
Chindiasean

790,413,447

25.18%

World

2,267,233,742

32.7%

United States

245,203,319

78.3%

European Union

359,530,110

71.5%
242

Table 4: Internet Population (As of Dec. 31, 2011)

Second, due to late economic development and technological
backwardness, a substantial portion of internet users are school- or
243
college-age students. In China, for example, internet users aged below
244
thirty made up close to sixty percent of the total internet population.
Thus, any law and policy relating to the internet is likely to have a
245
substantial impact on the future pillars in the country.
As far as
internet-related law reforms are concerned, the stakes may be higher
242. The data was taken or calculated from Internet World Stats, which is available at
http://www.internetworldstats.com.
243. See Wei Yanliang & Feng Xiaoqing, Comments on Cyber Copyright Disputes in
the People’s Republic of China: Maintaining the Status Quo While Expanding the Doctrine of
Profit-Making Purposes, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (2003) (discussing how
most online infringers in China are poor students).
244. CNNIC SURVEY REPORT, supra note 239, at 19.
245. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 705 (2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright Reform]
(discussing how criminalizing online file sharing can adversely impact “a large number of
individuals, including youngsters who are the future pillars of society”).
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than that of other type of intellectual property law reforms.
Third, many Asian countries, which range from China to Malaysia to
Singapore, continue to control the flow of information within society.
While human rights activists and commentators have heavily criticized
246
the censorship regimes within these countries, these regimes ironically
may provide the infrastructure needed to strengthen enforcement in the
digital environment. These countries therefore may provide alternative
models that may not exist in Western countries, although it remains to
be seen whether such models would be compatible with free speech,
247
free press, and privacy values found in other countries.
B. New Issues
1. Climate Change
One of the hottest issues in the international intellectual property
policy arena concerns the use of intellectual property law and policy to
respond to global climate change. Although it remains unclear what
responses countries can come up with, China and India—two powerful
countries that have significant carbon emissions—undoubtedly will play
very important roles in any international climate change negotiations.
The Copenhagen Summit already provides a very good example of the
248
important role China can play in environment-related discussions.
Capabilities for the development of climate change technology have
249
also emerged in China, India, and other Asian countries.
246. See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET
FILTERING 155–65 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (examining internet filtering in Asia);
see id. at 240–44, 263–71, 286–99, 325–28, 338–59, 364–74, 390–94, 420–24 (documenting
internet filtering in Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea,
Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam).
247. See Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1401–02 (2010)
(discussing how the graduated response system would undermine the protection of free
speech, free press, and privacy); Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 245, at 715
(discussing how the proposed disclosure and retention mechanism in Hong Kong’s digital
copyright reform would chill speech).
248. See Steve Charnovitz et al., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 93–94 (2009); Peter K. Yu, What Copenhagen Could Signal About U.S., China, DES
MOINES REG., Dec. 17, 2009; see also TAY, supra note 20, at 154 (“It is clear that Asia’s
continuing economic growth, while important for many, can have negative impacts on the
environment and climate change for the planet.”).
249. See EUR. PATENT OFFICE, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE
& SUSTAINABLE DEV., PATENTS AND CLEAN ENERGY: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
EVIDENCE AND POLICY: FINAL REPORT 32 (2010) (“In the photovoltaic sector, for example,
China has one of the largest producers and manufacturers, while India has one of the leading
producers and manufacturers in wind technology. Meanwhile Thailand has significant activity
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Moreover, because climate change discussions can lead to new
innovation solutions that did not exist in the past, Chindiasean can also
play a very important role in shaping the ongoing policy debate. As
Peter Drahos pointed out, the increasing demands for policy adjustment
to the global climate change requires “the US and China . . . to think
about [the climate change, energy, and intellectual property rights
250
regimes] in an integrated way.”
By linking intellectual property law
and policy to environmental law regimes, Chindiasean may be able to
come up with new practical home-grown solutions that will receive more
buy-in from China and India at the international level.
Those solutions are likely important to many Asian countries, which
have significant population and resources in areas that are vulnerable to
floods, hurricanes, typhoons, tsunamis, severe droughts, or
251
desertification.
If the intellectual property system is not better
managed to address climate change, those countries may suffer
significantly. The tsunamis in Thailand, Indonesia, and other coastal
areas in December 2004 and the vast damage resulting from such
252
catastrophes remain vivid memories for many Asians.
2. Alternative Innovation Models
Although the existing intellectual property system focuses primarily
on pathbreaking creations and innovations, many Asian countries have
253
embraced sequential and cumulative innovations. For example, utility
in the sectors of both photovoltaic and wind technologies.”); id. at 34 (“In geothermal
technology China has made a significant entry into the field, virtually matching the patenting
rates of the UK, Sweden and Italy. If these trends continue, China is likely to emerge as a key
patenting country in these fields.”).
250. Peter Drahos, The China-US Relationship on Climate Change, Intellectual
Property and CCS: Requiem for a Species?, 1 WIPO J. 125, 130 (2009).
251. See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2009).
252. See Robert D. Mcfadden, Walls of Water Sweeping All in Their Path: Families,
Communities, Livelihoods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A10 (reporting about the tsunamis
in Asia); Amy Waldman, Thousands Die as Quake-Spawned Waves Crash onto Coastlines
Across Southern Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A1 (same).
253. See Hiroyuki Odagiri et al., IPR and the Catch-Up Process in Japan, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP, supra note 121, at 95,
126 (“In indigenous sectors with mostly tiny firms [in Japan], many innovations occur in the
form of practical devices rather than pure inventions.”); Reichman, supra note 16, at 1124
(distinguishing between “cumulative and sequential innovation” and “path-breaking
innovation” and noting that “how to protect cumulative and sequential innovation—as
distinct from path-breaking innovation—becomes an ever more pressing problem as more
small- and medium-sized firms acquire a taste and capacity for such innovation”); see also
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127–59 (2004) (discussing sequential

NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

390

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

4/18/2012 6:56 PM

[Vol. 16:2

models or petty patents remain an important feature of the intellectual
254
As Assafa Endeshaw
property systems in many of these countries.
described:
[Within Asia, t]here are different approaches towards minor
inventions and their terms of protection as well as that for
patents. Thus Indonesia accords protection to small product
improvements through a “Simple Patent” (obviously a “petty
patent”) for one time of five years. Vietnam, on the other hand,
grants protection for “Utility Solutions” for six years. By
contrast, Malaysia recognizes “Utility Innovations” for a period
of five years but renewable for a further five. The Philippines
recognizes design patents (which include utility models) and
protects them for five years, too, but with a possibility of
255
renewals for two consecutive periods of five years.
In recent years, a shanzhai culture emerged in China, raising
challenging questions about the acceptable boundaries of sequential and
256
While many intellectual property rights
cumulative innovation.
holders and commentators consider the shanzhai phenomenon highly
undesirable, shanzhai products do offer some benefits, especially when
the products provide improvements that otherwise would not occur. In
a world where intellectual property rights holders are sometimes
reluctant to undertake innovation, shanzhai products may provide the
much-needed work around to advance technological developments.
Shanzhai products, indeed, may provide an efficient means for Asian
countries to catch up with their more developed trading partners. It
may also allow nationals of those countries to appropriate the
257
consumers’ surplus.
innovation and the need to protect cumulative innovators).
254. See, e.g., Preston M. Torbert & Zhao Jia, People’s Republic of China, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 128, at 233, 238 (discussing
utility models and designs in China); Jacinto D. Jimenez, Philippines, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 128, at 270 (discussing designs and utility models
in the Philippines); Joon K. Park, South Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST
ASIA, supra note 128, at 337, 337 (noting the adoption of the Utility Model Act in South
Korea); Michael F. Fedrick, Taiwan, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA,
supra note 128, at 389–90 (discussing the utility model patent protection in Taiwan).
255. ASSAFA, supra note 75, at 73.
256. “Originally, shan zhai was used to refer to a bandit stronghold outside
government control [in imperial China]; today it is shorthand for a multitude of knockoffs,
fakes, and pirated products. These include everything from mobile phones to medicine and
movies to makeup, and they permeate China’s consumer markets.” TSE, supra note 4, at 79.
257. See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 12 (2010)
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More importantly, the continued development of shanzhai products
258
may suggest the existence of an alternative path to innovation. Like
259
the Beijing Consensus, China’s innovation models may attract the
attention of other countries that are working hard to catch up with
developed countries. Indeed, commentators have begun to appreciate
the different forms of innovation that are slowly emerging in China.
While Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson discussed what they called “cost
260
261
innovation,” Tan Yinglan focused on “process innovation.”
Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree went even further in their
262
recent book, Run of the Red Queen.
As they pointed out, “China’s
innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or incremental)
innovation but also in the organization of production, manufacturing
techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and second-generation
263
innovation.”
Interestingly, the authors concluded that these other
forms of innovation can complement the breakthrough innovation
264
embraced by the United States and other developed countries.
As
Breznitz and Murphree insightfully observed:
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the
iPod and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these
products without China.
In the world of flexible mass
production, the Red Queen country [referring to China or
countries with a similar innovation model] needs the novel-

(“Because the infringing goods in these situations are of the same standard, or close to that
standard, the unauthorised production of those goods may actually result in a consumers’
surplus: consumers are now getting the same products for a much lower price.”).
258. See TSE, supra note 4, at 79 (“The best shan zhai firms, which have established
themselves not through thievery but through knockoffs and imitations, have also disrupted
the status quo by inventing new and ingenious business strategies tailored specifically to local
markets.”); id. at 80 (noting that shanzhai firms “have short cycle times for new product
introductions”).
259. See generally RAMO, supra note 9 (advancing the concept of the Beijing
Consensus); see also HALPER, supra note 9 (discussing the Beijing Consensus).
260. See generally ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR:
HOW CHINESE COST INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007)
(advancing the concept of cost innovation and discussing its global implications).
261. TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING
THE WORLD xii (2011).
262. DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN:
GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 4
(2011).
263. Id. at 4.
264. See id. at 206 (“[T]hanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China
need not be seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.”).
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product innovators to keep churning out new ideas, and the
novel-product-innovating countries need the Red Queen country
to keep innovating on almost every aspect of production and
265
delivery.
3. Special and Differential Treatment
In the past, special and differential treatment was developed to
enable less developed countries to promote internal economic, social,
cultural, and technological developments and to facilitate efforts to
catch up with countries in the developed world. Although the TRIPS
Agreement sought to build a super-size-fits-all template, by now it has
been clear that such a template does not work well in the less developed
world. It is also worth noting that the proponents of reforms to
strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement sometimes
266
have ignored both the preamble and objectives of the TRIPS
267
Agreement.
Indeed, the problems created by the TRIPS Agreement and the
international intellectual property system have led to the establishment
of many new development agendas at the WTO, WIPO, and in other
forums governing public health, human rights, biological diversity, food
268
and agriculture, and information and communications. At the WTO,
for example, the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations was
launched in November 2001 to facilitate greater cooperation between
269
developed and less developed countries. Of notable importance was
the adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (“Ministerial
265. Id. at 18.
266. See TRIPS Agreement pmbl., recital 6 (explicitly recognizing “the special needs of
the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 726, 747–48 (2011) (discussing the portion of the preamble of the TRIPS
Agreement that focuses on the interests of less developed countries).
267. See TRIPS Agreement art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.”); see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the
TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1000–08 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Objectives and
Principles] (discussing article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement).
268. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 511–40.
269. See, e.g., Louise Amoore et al., Series Preface to NARLIKAR, supra note 188, at xiii
(noting that the launch of the Doha Round was “assisted to a large degree by the conciliatory
international political climate that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington”).
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Declaration”), the Doha Declaration, and a new protocol to amend
272
the TRIPS Agreement.
At WIPO, Argentina and Brazil also called for the establishment of
273
a Development Agenda.
Together with other less developed
countries and civil society organizations, they successfully demanded
reforms that sought to both enhance the development dimension of
WIPO and restore the balance in the international intellectual property
274
system.
The agenda, which was adopted at the WIPO General
275
Assembly in October 2007, now includes forty-five recommendations
for action that range from technical assistance and capacity building to
norm setting and public policy and from technology transfer to
276
assessment, evaluation, and impact studies.
To some extent, the ongoing demands for special and differential
treatment in the international intellectual property system are similar to
the push for a greater “margin of appreciation” within the international
277
human rights regime.
These demands, indeed, recall many of the
270. Word Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). Paragraph 19 of the Ministerial Declaration
specifically instructed the TRIPS Council “to examine . . . the relationship between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity [and] the protection of
traditional knowledge and folklore.” Id. ¶ 19.
271. Doha Declaration, supra note 228; see also Yu, The International Enclosure
Movement, supra note 192, at 872–74 (discussing the Doha Declaration).
272. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 229; See Yu, The International Enclosure
Movement, supra note 192, at 881–86 (discussing the proposed article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement).
273. WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration
of Issues Raised in Document, WO/GA/31/11, IIM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim_1/iim_1_4.pdf.
274. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 519–20
(discussing the two lines of reforms that were included in the WIPO Development Agenda).
275. Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO
(Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article 0071.html;
see also Ruth L. Okediji, History Lessons for the WIPO Development Agenda, in THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 137, 152 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009) (noting that “the Development
Agenda is framed as a regime of special and differential . . . treatment for [developing and
least developed countries]”).
276. See The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda,
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last visited
July 6, 2008) (listing all the 45 recommendations). The six different clusters include: (1)
technical assistance and capacity building; (2) norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and
public domain; (3) technology transfer, information and communication technologies and
access to knowledge; (4) assessment, evaluation and impact studies; (5) institutional matters
including mandate and governance; and (6) other issues. Id.
277. As Laurence Helfer explained:
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relativist discussions prevalent in the “Asian values” debate.
As
intellectual property and human rights become increasingly linked to
each other in international policy discussions, the right to
279
280
development and the right to culture, the two rights to which Asian
The doctrine is essentially the degree of discretion that the ECHR is willing to grant
national decision makers who seek to fulfill their human rights obligations under the
treaty. Although initially framed as requiring a decision in favor of a state where a
government’s decision to declare a public emergency (and thus to suspend most of
its human rights obligations) was “on the margin” of compatibility with the treaty,
the margin of appreciation doctrine has, over time, become a more limited tool by
which the Court permits states a modicum of breathing room in balancing the
protection of civil and political liberties against other pressing societal concerns.
What is most striking about the margin of appreciation is that it expressly
contemplates that international treaty obligations originating from a unitary text
may be interpreted in different ways in different states. Although partially in
tension with autonomous and effective interpretations of the treaty, the doctrine has
become an essential ingredient of the ECHR’s success in fashioning an effective
system of adjudication. Given that most of the rights and freedoms protected by the
European Convention are not protected unconditionally, but rather expressly
permit states to impose restrictions for specified reasons and under certain
conditions, the Court must be sensitive to the fact that different acts of national
balancing may be compatible with the treaty. Thus, although the effectiveness
principle requires that restrictions on protected liberties must be construed
narrowly, the ECHR has held that states “enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in
assessing whether and to what extent an interference is necessary.” Only after
granting such discretion will the Court exercise its independent “European
supervision” to the relevant legislation and the decisions applying it.
Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case
for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 404–05 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
278. See discussion supra Part I.A.
279. Article 2(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development, for example,
provides:
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development
policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting
therefrom.
Declaration on the Right to Development art. 2(3), G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
280. With respect to the protection of intangible cultural heritage, an issue that is of
great importance to many less developed countries in Asia, article 31(1) of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples further declares:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well
as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human
and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and
flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop
their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and
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countries have paid special attention, are likely to become important
281
features of the future international intellectual property debate.
4. Uneven Economic and Technological Developments
Uneven development is a major characteristic of the less developed
world, in particular the rapidly-growing emerging countries such as
China and India and those with a significant gap between the rich and
the poor. As I noted elsewhere in the case of China, the many conflicts
and competing interests within China are likely to drive the country’s
leaders to develop a “schizophrenic” nationwide intellectual property
282
While the country wants stronger protection for its fastpolicy.
growing industries, it prefers weaker protection in fields related to
traditional cultural expressions.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 31(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295
(Sept.
13,
2007),
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev
/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
281. In chronological order, the recent U.N. documents addressing the interface
between intellectual property and human rights include: Intellectual Property Rights and
Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046704e?Opendocument; The High
Commissioner, Report of the High Commissioner on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on
Human Rights, delivered to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13
(June
27,
2001),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/59051610
4e92e87bc1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G0114345.pdf; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral
and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which
He Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan.
12, 2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/
03902145edbbe797c125711500584ea8/$ FILE/G0640060.pdf. For a discussion of these
documents, see Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 522–27. For
discussions of the interface between human rights and intellectual property, see generally
WILLEM GROSHEIDE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX
(2010); LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011); INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008); WIPO, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related to
ICESCR Article 15(1)(c), in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 305, 315 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell
eds., 2002); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human
Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 28; Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2007).
282. Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25–26.
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pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs, due to its
huge population, continued economic dependence on agriculture, the
leaders’ worries about public health issues, and their concerns about the
283
people’s overall well-being.
Interestingly, the challenges confronting China can be found in other
similarly-situated countries, which range from India to Indonesia. As
Fareed Zakaria observed, “India might have several Silicon Valleys, but
it also has three Nigerias within it—that is, more than 300 million people
living on less than a dollar a day. It is home to 40 percent of the world’s
284
poor and has the world’s second-largest HIV-positive population.”
Indeed, “many middle-income developing countries . . . may want
stronger protection for their fast-growing industries and highly
economically developed regions, they want weaker protection in the
285
remaining areas.” Given the complexity of the various economies in
Chindiasean, the group may be able to draw on their own experience
and problems to develop solutions that address the uneven development
problems. Such solutions may be useful for the other less developed
countries outside the regional alliance, such as Brazil and South Africa.
5. Abuse of Rights and Restraint on Trade
Less developed countries, most notably Brazil and India, have long
held positions that call for the provision of safeguards against the abuse
of intellectual property rights and restraints on trade. As Brazil
declared in a submission to the TRIPS Negotiating Group:
When one speaks of “rights” of intellectual property owners, one
is automatically bound to deal with the subject of “obligations”
of these owners.
The objective of such obligations which deserves priority
attention is to allow greater access to technological innovation
for IPR users. If the whole attention of the discussions is
centered on the interests of IPR owners, the balance of the entire
286
IPR system is not taken into account.

283. See id. at 25.
284. ZAKARIA, supra note 3, at 133; see also VINAY RAI & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THINK
INDIA: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S NEXT SUPERPOWER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR EVERY
AMERICAN 211 (2007) (“One India wants. The Other India hopes. One India leads. The
Other India follows.” (italics omitted)).
285. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 559.
286. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods [TRIPS Negotiating Group], Submission from Brazil ¶
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During the TRIPS negotiations, India further reminded the delegates
that “it was only the restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the
owners of the IPRs that could be considered to be trade-related because
287
they alone distorted or impeded international trade.”
With China and India as its key constituents, Chindiasean is likely to
call for a recalibration of the balance in the international intellectual
property system by demanding a greater emphasis on not only rights but
also responsibilities.
For example, they could demand greater
protection against the abuse of rights and restraints on trade. Such
positions are well supported by the text and the negotiating history of
the TRIPS Agreement, which already includes many provisions
targeting abuse of rights or process and restraints on trade or
288
competition.
The preamble of the TRIPS Agreement memorialized
the negotiators’ desire to “reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade . . . and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers
289
to legitimate trade.”
Article 8.2 further states that “[a]ppropriate
measures . . . may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer
290
of technology.”
C. Summary
In sum, many issues can find themselves on to Chindiasean’s policy
agenda. Some of these issues are traditional issues advanced by less
developed countries, many of which were under negotiation before even
291
the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement.
Others, however, are
new issues on which the international community has yet to achieve a
consensus or about which countries have not formulated a position.
12, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/30 (Oct. 31, 1988).
287. TRIPS Negotiating Group, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 12–14 July 1989:
Note by the Secretariat ¶ 4, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989).
288. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement pmbl., recital 1; id. arts. 8.2, 40.1, 40.2, 41.1, 48.1, 50.3,
53, 63.1, 67.
289. Id. pmbl., recital 1.
290. Id. art. 8.2 (emphasis added); see also Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note
267, at 1016–18 (discussing article 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement).
291. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 468–511
(discussing the demands of less developed countries as they relate to the development of the
Stockholm Protocol Regarding Developing Countries, the formation of WIPO as a
specialized agency of the United Nations, the adoption of the draft International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, and the revision of the Paris Convention).
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Because it remains unclear whether these issues will actually be
negotiated along the divide between developed and less developed
countries, Chindiasean would have an opportunity to shape the
negotiation of many of these issues.
Even more interestingly, because the Chindiasean members have
very diverse backgrounds, technological capabilities, and innovation
paths, the positions they take are likely to be quite different from those
of developed countries. As I noted in the inaugural issue of The WIPO
Journal, “[I]t is premature to assume that less-developed countries, once
developed, will always want the existing international intellectual
property system. There is a good chance that they may want or need
292
something rather different!”
In effect, Chindiasean may set
alternative paths that provide other less developed countries, including
those outside Asia, with some attractive policy choices. The positions
Chindiasean takes therefore may help provide the much-needed
momentum for reforms within the existing international intellectual
property system, similar to the role played by Brazil and India a few
decades ago.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that, in the area of intellectual property law
and policy, one can neither locate any underlying distinct values,
approaches, or practices nor identify established pan-Asian positions.
Nevertheless, the middle- and low-income Asian countries may be able
to work together to foster regional positions to influence future
international intellectual property negotiations. While Japan and, to
some extent, South Korea are unlikely to join other Asian countries in
taking a strong pro-development stand for Asia, China, India, and
ASEAN could team up to maximize their leverage and voice in the
international intellectual property arena. They could help shape the
development of a powerful regional normative community.
Although the positions and interests of the twelve members of
Chindiasean continue to differ, developing a united front for these
countries most certainly will help ensure a more desirable bargaining
outcome in areas that range from the reshaping of global intellectual
property enforcement norms to the protection of traditional knowledge
and cultural expressions to the promotion of access to essential
medicines. Having unified positions among these countries may also set
292. Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future,
1 WIPO J. 1, 15 (2009).
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alternative paths for other less developed countries outside Asia. Thus,
from the standpoint of international intellectual property policymaking,
the growing intellectual property developments in Asia deserve our
greater scholarly attention, even if this century does not end up
becoming an Asian century.

